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CHAPTER 1 “INTRODUCTION” 
It was in such a context that Trotsky scorned “papist-Quaker babble about the sanctity of human 
life,” and Lenin approvingly quoted Machiavelli to the effect that “violence can only be met with 
violence.”1   
 
In 1937, following her unexpected arrest, Party member Eugenia Ginzburg languished in 
a Soviet prison. Ginzburg’s cellmate, an old peasant woman, did not understand why she had been 
arrested by officers of the NKVD, Stalin’s secret police. When Ginzburg asked the old woman 
why she was being held, the woman, more than a little perplexed, said that the officers accused 
her of being a “tractorist.” A tractorist? thought Ginzburg. “But as God’s my witness,” the woman 
continued, “I never went near one of those cursed things… They don’t put old women like me on 
tractors.” Ginzburg finally realized that the poor old woman, an illiterate peasant with absolutely 
no understanding of political issues, was in fact being held as a Trotskyist, a supporter of the 
opposition and therefore a counterrevolutionary enemy of the state.2   
 By late 1937, NKVD officers flooded the Gulag and prisons throughout the Soviet Union 
with Party members like Ginzburg and peasants like the unnamed old woman. They shared cells 
with former kulaks, priests, family members of the “socially dangerous,” and other “anti-Soviet 
elements.” They came from both the cities and the countryside. They came from the Baltic states, 
Central Asia, Siberia, and beyond.  This was an all-encompassing purge, known today as the Great 
Terror. 
 The mass violence and repression that engulfed the Soviet Union in the 1930s was marked 
by two consecutive waves of horrific terror. The first wave washed away 40,000 Party elites and 
25,000 Soviet citizens because of their family ties or friendships. These ordinary people, the 
                                                          
1 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, Volume 1 (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 312. 
2 Eugenia Semyonovna Ginzburg, Journey into the Whirlwind (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 182. 
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“other” victims of the Great Terror, have been the central focus of social and cultural historians 
since the 1970s. The second wave, immeasurably more destructive, which included the mass 
operations and the national operations, consumed 625,000 people.3 By the time the terror subsided, 
NKVD agents had executed 690,000 men, women, and children.4  
 Those specifically targeted during the first wave of purges, the “old guard” of Party elites, 
included high ranking members of the Politburo, military officers, industrial managers, and former 
leaders of the NKVD.5 The purge of the old guard quickly became a public spectacle, with show 
trials covered across the globe by the international press. Accused of elaborate plots and 
conspiracies to murder Stalin and overthrow the Party, many of the founding fathers of the 
Bolshevik regime lost their lives in this first wave of terror. As the show trials both enthralled and 
horrified citizens throughout the Soviet Union, local Party leaders pleaded for vigilance, 
encouraging peasants and factory workers to “unmask” the enemies who sought to undermine the 
revolution. Fear and paranoia reigned in urban areas like Moscow and Leningrad, as workers 
denounced one another and families were torn apart. In contrast, the second wave was veiled in 
secrecy. For decades, a comprehensive picture of the mass operations and national operations 
remained inaccessible.6 These victims, generally ordinary men and women with no political ties 
                                                          
3 The mass operations began on 30 July, 1937, when the NKVD issued Order 00447. This order targeted former 
kulaks, criminals, and anti-Soviet elements. NKVD agents executed approximately 380, 000 people because of 
Order 00447. The national operations began on 9 July, 1937, when the NKVD issued Order 00485. This order 
targeted Polish nationals. Similar orders followed, targeting other diaspora nationalities. NKVD agents executed 
approximately 245,000 people during the national operations. See chapter four for specific details on these 
operations. 
4 For the number of victims, see footnote 36. 
5 This group is collectively known as the nomenklatura. 
6 For decades, the Great Terror was seen as a series of show trials and army purges that targeted Party elites. See 
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 107. Nikita 
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in 1956, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in 1962, 
Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror in 1968, and Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago in 1973-1975 all helped 
Western scholars better understand the scale and scope of the violence. See Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A 
History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 261. 
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or designs, were labeled “enemies of the people” and “anti-Soviet elements” by Stalin and his 
leadership group.  
 There is now a consensus among historians about what happened during the Great Terror. 
There is no consensus, however, regarding how and why it happened. A survey of the 
historiography reveals two distinct approaches to understanding the Terror. Whereas one approach 
argues for order and a central orchestration of events, the other focuses on chaos, contingency, and 
mass participation. The former is overwhelmingly practiced by political historians and the latter 
by social and cultural historians.   
  
Historiography  
Sheila Fitzpatrick is one of the leading scholars of the Soviet Union and Stalinism. She is 
also among the first to separate herself from the old paradigm of Soviet studies that focused 
exclusively on Stalin and ignored the lives of millions of ordinary Soviet citizens. Fitzpatrick’s 
bottom-up approach revealed entirely new and unexpected vistas, emphasizing the importance of 
social forces in trying to understand the phenomenon of Stalinism. In 1999, she published 
Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the 1930s, arguing 
that numerous causes resulted in the Great Terror. It was an environment plagued with mass 
hysteria, where “networks and conspiracies” lurked behind every corner. Stress and strain followed 
from rapid industrialization and collectivization. There was extreme tension within the Party after 
the assassination of Leningrad Party boss Sergei Kirov, along with apprehension and anxiety 
regarding the possibility of a second world war.7 Fitzpatrick contends that it is a mistake to seek 
                                                          
7 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 192-193. 
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out reason and rationality, arguing that “Soviet terror was random,” and that this randomness 
precluded any possibility of premeditated design.8  
Others, following Fitzpatrick’s lead, have put forth similar arguments. In Inventing the 
Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, Wendy Z. Goldman explores the behavior of 
ordinary people in five Moscow factories during the tumultuous episode of the Great Terror. 
Goldman argues that the agents of terror were not only NKVD officials, but also ordinary men and 
women who actively participated in generating and prolonging the violence. The NKVD officers 
made the arrests, but it was the people who “penned denunciations, wrote defamatory articles in 
the factory and wall newspapers, and accused shop heads of causing accidents.”9 Goldman 
demonstrates the absurdly circular nature of the terror – just as events affected the daily lives of 
people, so too did the daily lives of people affect events. Like Fitzpatrick, Goldman argues that 
the Great Terror was a multicausal and multilayered phenomenon. The whole of society, she 
argues, participated in the hunt for “masked” enemies.10 “It was a profoundly violent process,” 
Goldman writes, “whereby the country began to resemble a body in the throes of some terrible 
autoimmune disease, attacking and destroying its own organs, nervous system, flesh, and blood.”11 
In his analysis of the Great Terror, Stephen F. Cohen speaks of “a multiplicity of social, 
cultural, and political causes.”12 Emphasizing the chaotic, elemental nature of the terror, Cohen 
refers to the phenomenon as “the crimson madness.” Cohen argues that criminal complicity rests 
not only with Stalin, the Politburo, and the NKVD, but also with Party and state officials, petty 
                                                          
8 Fitzpatrick, 192. 
9 Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 20. 
10 See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
11 Goldman, 297. 
12 Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics & History Since 1917 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 22. 
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informers, and slanderers.13 In Cohen’s analysis, the purges were irrational, wrecking and retarding 
many of the achievements of 1929-1936. For Cohen, Stalinism represented a withdrawal from 
Leninism, “a radical departure from Bolshevik programmatic thinking.”14 Stalin broke free from 
the ideology of Marx and Lenin, Cohen argues, creating his own path for the Soviet Union, 
sacrificing millions of his own citizens in the process. 
Robert W. Thurston also focuses on the actions of ordinary people throughout the purges. 
The Terror, for Thurston, was the tragic result of mass anxiety and paranoia. He highlights “a 
distressing human inclination to panic and to believe in plots, which then must be crushed at the 
cost of violating individuals’ rights.”15 A fear of secret agents and spies working with foreign 
nations and plotting the downfall of the Soviet Union affected everyone from Stalin to the millions 
of ordinary citizens who participated in the process of terror. Thurston writes, “the interaction of 
society and a sometimes hysterical leadership produced repulsive acts in the late 1930s – though 
the public often considered these steps necessary to eliminate a grave threat.”16 Stalin was only 
reacting to the madness, Thurston argues, not creating it. It was not until much later, after so many 
had lost their lives, that “the leadership regained some of its senses.”17  
This notion of chaos and reaction is echoed in much of the contemporary historiography. 
Some scholars, such as J. Arch Getty, argue that Stalinism was defined more by chaos and 
inefficiency than by lethal cunning and political savvy.18 Getty contends that Stalin had no master 
plan to carry out the Terror. In an interview on Sean’s Russia Blog, Getty states that the mass 
                                                          
13 Cohen, 98. 
14 Cohen, 62. 
15 Robert W. Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia: 1934-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 228. 
16 Thurston, 228. 
17 Ibid. 
18 J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1935-
1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) xii. 
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violence of the Great Terror followed from a fearful and insecure regime. Stalin and his leadership 
group were “afraid of everything.”19 They suffered from an insecurity complex that forced them 
to resort to violence and repression. Stalin and his cronies were profoundly reactive, Getty argues, 
reacting to the chaos that surrounded them, to the fears that threatened to plunge them into oblivion.  
What we see from these historians is a commitment to the methodologies employed by the 
early revisionists. The emphasis is on social forces, on randomness, chaos, and contingency. They 
argue for mass participation in extending and augmenting the Terror. They portray Stalin as 
reactive, paranoid, and impotent – lacking real power and control, forced to resort to violence and 
repression.20 An alternative approach, practiced by many of today’s most renowned political 
historians who have rejected the revisionist thesis, emphasize the manifestation of political 
ideology. They demonstrate order, rationality, and express directives. Furthermore, they reject the 
notion of mass participation. Regarding Stalin, they argue that his actions were premeditated and 
proactive.  
In The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, Martin Malia writes, 
“it takes a great ideal to produce a great crime.” 21 For Stalin, the great ideal was socialism, and 
the great crime the purges of the 1930s. As Malia argues throughout his book, socialism does not 
designate an empirical reality, but rather an idea of a possibility, a radiant utopian future. Stalin’s 
vision of a socialist utopia in Russia involved a radical transformation of society, resulting in a 
kingdom of harmony and equality. Stalin had specific goals: to overcome military, cultural, 
industrial, and agricultural backwardness, and to realize Marxism by creating a nation of workers 
                                                          
19 J. Arch Getty interviewed on Sean’s Russia Blog. <www.podcasts.com> (November 15, 2016). 
20 This point is stressed by Getty. The theory that truly powerful regimes do not need to employ mass violence and 
repression, that, on the contrary, such methods are the hallmarks of impotent regimes, is eloquently put forth by 
Hannah Arendt in On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Inc. 1969). 
21 Malia, 4. 
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rather than peasants and small businessmen. His methods for achieving these goals included rapid 
industrialization, collectivization, cultural revolution, and mass purges. By analyzing the effects 
of the Terror, Malia demonstrates purpose and design rather than chaos and randomness. As a 
result of the purges, the army, the Party, and industry were completely renovated and rejuvenated. 
1,500,000 new “thirty-something” men and women took over key positions. These were products 
of the cultural revolution, pupils of dialectical materialism, and graduates of technical and 
engineering schools. Stalin had brought forth the “new Soviet man,” homo sovieticus,22 by washing 
away the old guard. And this was the essential reason for the purges. As Malia writes, the ultimate 
rationale of the Great Terror was for Stalin to give himself a new Party and a new corps of cadres 
in every field of national activity.23 
In 2010, Timothy Snyder published his critically acclaimed Bloodlands: Europe Between 
Hitler and Stalin, arguing that the mass murders of the Great Terror were express directives and 
explicit policies, political in nature, with the central goal of manifesting a utopian ideology. What 
mattered for Stalin, above all else, was the building and defense of socialism in Russia.24 The most 
effective and efficient way to realize the goal was the implementation of mass killing policies, 
eliminating from the body politic hundreds of thousands of anti-Soviet elements. These policies 
were “purposeful,”25 and, according to the Bulgarian-French historian Tsvetan Todorov, “given 
the goals they set for themselves, the choices of Stalin and Hitler were, alas, rational.”26 Snyder 
presents Stalin as a man not reacting to present dilemmas, but proactively employing policies 
                                                          
22 Malia, 229. 
23 Malia, 257. 
24 Malia, 239. See also Snyder, X. 
25 Snyder, 409. 
26 Tsvetan Todorov, quoted in Snyder, 396. 
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designed to manifest his ideological vision. Stalin was looking to the future, and he knew that only 
a radical social upheaval could secure that future.  
One of the more overlooked modern Russian historians is A. L. Unger. In 1969 Unger 
wrote an essay entitled “Stalin’s Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the Great Purge.” 
Although for decades the revisionists denied the validity of such arguments, much of the 
contemporary historiography of politically-minded scholars builds on Unger’s work. Unger 
believed that the desire for modernization played the central role in the purges. As a result of the 
purges, Stalin’s policies created “a new leading stratum.” Educated specialists replaced nearly 60% 
of the Party. In “an era of rapid industrialization, requiring technically qualified and politically 
reliable specialist cadres,” these policies were essential for the survival of the Party.27 Stalin, 
fearful of his nation’s ability to meet the challenges of the modern world, said his regime “proved 
to be unarmed and absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing 
industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause of the working class.”28 Unger 
argues that the primary concern of Stalin and his leadership group was “to find sufficient cadres 
to run Soviet Russia’s expanding industrial empire and its ancillary services.”29 Here again we see 
purpose. We see a goal and a means to achieve that goal. 
In 2009, Paul Hagenloh published Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in 
the USSR, 1926-1941. Hagenloh argues that Stalin, mindful of potential conflicts with Germany 
and Japan, was concerned with numerous anti-Soviet contingents and non-Russian populations. 
Stalin and his advisors, led by Nikolai Ezhov, designed the mass operations and national operations 
                                                          
27 A. L. Unger, “Stalin’s Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the Great Purge,” Soviet Studies 20, no.3 (1969), 
321. 
28 Joseph Stalin, quoted in Unger, 322. 
29 Unger, 330. 
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to rid the Soviet Union of a potential social base of insurrection.30 They believed they could define 
and shape populations by identifying undesirable cohorts and eliminating them from the body 
politic. Certain populations were identified as “dangerous elements.” If they had the potential to 
revolt, to fight alongside enemy states, or to undermine the Soviet Union from within, then they 
were quickly and ruthlessly repressed. One of Hagenloh’s most valuable contributions to the 
literature is his evaluation of the arguments for mass participation. He argues that in both rural and 
urban areas the mass operations and national operations were essentially police operations, that 
there was little reliance on denunciations and other forms of popular participation. Furthermore, 
Hagenloh states that the social historians who dominated the field between the 1970s and the 1990s 
exclusively and intentionally focused on social activism. Popular participation, Hagenloh 
concludes, had no influence or impact on the mass operations or national operations. These 
operations resulted from the express orders of Stalin and were carried out entirely by the NKVD.31 
Oleg V. Khlevniuk wrote Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle in 2009. 
Khlevniuk argues that the Great Terror was centrally orchestrated, “a series of purposeful and 
carefully planned centralized operations.”32 Stalin had two specific goals: destroy a potential “fifth 
column” and purge the leading cadres. The latter would eliminate the old guard, many of whom 
had been involved in opposition movements and could no longer be trusted by Stalin, and who by 
1936 had lost their “revolutionary zeal.”33 The former, the potential “fifth column,” were ordinary 
citizens, but they were also, in many cases, former members of parties hostile to the Bolsheviks. 
More importantly, after revolution, civil war, collectivization, dekulakization, and years of 
                                                          
30 Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 250. 
31 See Hagenloh 260 and 416 (note 178). 
32 Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle, translated by Nora Seligman Favorov (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 167. 
33 Khlevniuk, 171. 
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successive Party purges, they represented the millions of people, and their families, who had been 
harmed in some way by the Bolsheviks. They could not be trusted if war broke out, and Stalin was 
convinced that a second great war was inevitable. These millions of people would turn against 
Stalin and the Soviet Union – they would unite to form a “fifth column.”  Add to this number the 
millions of religious believers who could never accept Bolshevik ideology and the millions of 
national contingents who felt they had no place in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and the implementation 
of the Great Terror appears both rational and necessary. The policies and practices that resulted in 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people were devised and directed by Stalin and his inner 
circle – Molotov, Voroshilov, Kagonovich, Zhadnov, and of course Ezhov, the “bloody dwarf” – 
and not the result of mass participation. As Khlevniuk writes, “theories about the elemental, 
spontaneous nature of the terror, about a loss of central control over the course of the mass 
repression, and about the role of regional leaders in initiating the terror simply are not supported 
by the historical record.”34 
The historiography demonstrates two often conflicting approaches and methodologies. One 
group, usually but not always made up of social and cultural historians, influenced by the 
revisionist movement, focusses on social forces and popular participation. In this view, the Great 
Terror is marked by elemental chaos and mass anxiety. The other group, generally made up of 
political historians, focuses on a centrally orchestrated attempt to achieve specific regime goals. 
Express directives were carried out, rapidly and efficiently, by NKVD officers. The Great Terror, 
for these historians, is defined by a monstrous reason and rationality, stressing that the regime was 
in complete control from beginning to end. 
                                                          
34 Khlevniuk, xix. 
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Whether the Great Terror has been presented as a spontaneous response to stress and strain 
or as calculated program designed to rejuvenate the Party and protect the Soviet Union from 
potential enemies, it is important to note that, paradoxically, both sides have revealed versions of 
the truth. This strange conclusion follows from the nature of the Great Terror and the way different 
historians have approached it. For those who have focused on the show trials, urban reactions, 
media coverage, mass hysteria, and mass participation, there certainly was chaos and social 
activism. Nearly 25,000 people lost their lives because of a coworker’s denunciation or because a 
family member or friend was thought to be an “enemy of the people.” Party leaders encouraged 
participation and newspapers fueled the fires on a daily basis. The world watched as top Party 
members during the show trials admitted their “plots” to destroy Stalin and restore capitalism. 
They watched in horror and dismay as the Bolsheviks put to death 40,000 Party elites.35 But this 
first wave represents only 9% of the total number of executions during the Great Terror. Most 
contemporary political historians have focused on the second wave, the mass and national 
operations. Some historians, such as Khlevniuk, have argued that the Great Terror actually began 
on 2 July 1937, a year after the first Moscow show trial. On this day the Politburo announced its 
resolution to repress “anti-Soviet elements.” NKVD Order 00447 soon followed, and the mass 
operations began. During these operations, secrecy was preserved and maintained. NKVD officers, 
following orders that were signed by Ezhov and approved by Stalin, arrested and either executed 
or sent to the Gulag nearly a million people. 625,000 were executed throughout the course of the 
mass and national operations, an astounding 91% of total executions for the Great Terror.36 
                                                          
35 Western newspapers extensively covered the Terror. See chapter 4 for examples of some of the coverage.  
36 These numbers are based on the most recent research by Khlevniuk, Getty, Snyder, Hagenloh, and others. As 
most of their numbers vary to some degree, I use an average in my work. Hagenloh suggests that violence and 
terror evolved throughout the 1930s in an increasingly systematic fashion. Stephen Wheatcroft rejects this 
argument in “Statistics,” a chapter in The Anatomy of Terror: Political Violence under Stalin, edited by James Harris 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
12 
 
 
 
Towards a New Understanding of the Great Terror    
“The Great Terror: Violence, Ideology, and the Building of Stalin’s Soviet Empire” is a study 
of the confluence of terror and ideology in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s rule. I argue that the 
intersection of ideology and circumstance, both foreign and domestic, resulted in the Great Terror. 
To understand the 1930s in the Soviet Union, and the phenomenon of the Great Terror in particular, 
it is necessary to expand one’s scale and scope, examining the global evolution of radical ideology 
following the First World War. By placing the Great Terror within both a global and a pan-
European context, it becomes evident that rather than being a phenomenon unique to the Soviet 
experiment, modern states around the world employed mass violence and repression throughout 
the interwar period. The Great Terror can neither be disconnected from the practices of modern 
statecraft nor separated from other key features of Stalinism, such as collectivization, 
industrialization, and cultural revolution.   
Stalin’s political development during the Civil War period, which mirrored the radicalization 
and militarization of the Bolsheviks, and which has been largely ignored by historians, is also 
indicative of the blood purges that would engulf the Soviet Union in the 1930s. As early as 1918, 
Stalin and the Bolsheviks were already using mass terror and repression, unleashing a rampage of 
bloody slaughter on civilian populations during the Red Terror when the Cheka executed an 
estimated 6,000 “enemies” within a two-month period. Stalin personally allowed hundreds of 
prisoners to die of starvation and ordered the executions of hundreds more in Tsaritsyn. He called 
for “open, mass, systematic terror against the bourgeoisie.”37 Trotsky believed that Stalin was 
molded by his experience in the Civil War.  
                                                          
37 Stephen Kotkin explores the impact of the Civil War period on Stalin in Stalin.  
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Much of the historiography of the Great Terror analyzes the purges in isolation, failing to 
connect the events of 1936-1938 to the other central “pillars” of Stalinism, and failing to place the 
violence and repression in larger pan-European and global context. When examined as a united 
revolutionary system, and not simply as an isolated aberration, a more comprehensive and nuanced 
picture emerges. Stalin’s ultimate goal was the building of a socialist utopia in Russia, a communist 
empire. To manifest this goal, he initiated four major programs of social, cultural, and political 
transformation – the “four pillars of Stalinism”: collectivization, industrialization, cultural 
revolution, and mass purges. Only by connecting the events of 1936-1938 with Stalin’s three other 
revolutionary programs is it possible to understand the Great Terror. And only by analyzing the 
impact of the mass destruction and devastation of the Great War, the perilous rise of fascism, and 
the threat of capitalist encirclement is it conceivable to put forth an argument with the potential to 
express the full range of causality.  
Stalinism must be studied as a total system, and this system needs to be analyzed as a whole, 
not broken up into isolated programs and processes. “The Great Terror” makes no distinction 
between Stalin the man and Stalinism the political system. The ideas that Stalin expressed in his 
writings and speeches led to particular choices – to institute collectivization, to pursue a policy of 
rapid industrialization, to initiate a cultural revolution, and to support NKVD orders that resulted 
in the executions of hundreds of thousands of people. Over time, beginning in the 1920s, the 
choices made by Stalin in response to problems and challenges manifested in the political system 
referred to as Stalinism. This system was the ultimate realization of a synthesis of ideas and ideals, 
practices and policies, or more specifically, ideology.  
This work advances the scholarship of modern Russian history, as well as modern European 
history, because it explores the Great Terror in a pan-European context. This is the only way to 
14 
 
 
 
reveal the essence of Stalinism – as a modern civilization, not a totalitarian dictatorship. It 
challenges much of the contemporary historiography, particularly the social and cultural historians 
who have argued for chaos, contingency, and mass popular participation. Additionally, it 
complements studies on both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Most importantly, it  contributes a 
new analysis on the connection between political ideology and state violence. 
Chapter 1 analyzes Soviet ideology, clarifying distinctions between Marxism, Leninism, and 
Stalinism. Chapter 2 focusses on the foreign and domestic circumstances that threatened the future 
of the Party and the Soviet Union, examining the crisis of interwar Europe, the rise of fascist Italy, 
and the menace of Nazi Germany. Chapter 3, using a narrative methodology, details the events of 
the Great Terror. My conclusion reveals the results of the Great Terror, arguing that the creation 
of the Soviet Empire, which emerged as a world superpower following the Second World War, 
was only possible because of the choices made by Stalin and his inner circle during the 1930s. In 
addition to examining a wide range of secondary sources, throughout most of this study I rely on 
an intellectual history approach, by employing a textual analysis of primary sources.
15 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 “SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND THE ENEMIES OF HISTORY” 
 
History knows no scruples and no hesitation. Inert and unerring, she flows towards her 
goal. At every bend in her course she leaves the mud which she carries and the corpses of 
the drowned. History knows her way. She makes no mistakes. He who has not absolute 
faith in History does not belong in the Party’s ranks.1  
 
Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko worked as a mechanic at the Kiev Fiber Factory in 
Soviet Ukraine. In Barracks 10, Room 6 of the company dormitory, Stepan lived with his wife, 
Aleksandra Andreevna. On the evening of 10 November 1937, NKVD officers arrived at the 
dormitory and arrested Stepan, charging him with the crime of “anti-Soviet agitation.” Stepan had 
once been a kulak, one of the Soviet Union’s wealthier peasants, and his crime, the interrogators 
told him, occurred several years earlier, long before he ever imagined that one day he would be 
working at a fiber factory in Kiev. When Stalin first initiated his collectivization program, 
disrupting the lives of millions of peasants throughout the Soviet Union, Stepan supposedly 
remarked, “The collective farms won’t last in any case, because the Soviet government is unstable, 
war is inevitable, the government will be smashed, and Germany will come to power.” He 
categorically denied the charge, but the arresting officers had already made up their minds, and 
because no material evidence was required to prove his guilt, Stepan’s fate had already been sealed. 
Four weeks later, on 9 December 1937, shortly before midnight, an officer took Stepan from his 
cell and led him to the basement of the prison where he was being held. The officer removed his 
pistol from its holster and fired a shot into the nape of Stepan’s neck. Once Stepan had fallen to 
the floor, the officer fired two more shots, making sure the prisoner was dead. Other officers then 
                                                          
1 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (New York: Scribner, 1941), 43-44. 
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loaded Stepan’s body in the back of a truck and drove to Bykivnia, where they dumped the body 
into a pit with thousands of other rotting corpses.2  
 
Esoteric Knowledge   
Martin Malia wrote, “The key to understanding the Soviet phenomenon is ideology.”3 
From the founding of the Bolshevik Party to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, ideology was the 
quintessence, the driving force, the foundation upon which generations of Communist leaders 
constructed the Soviet Union. Stepan’s murder, like the murders of hundreds of thousands of others 
during the Great Terror, was the direct result of ideology intersecting with geopolitical 
circumstances. Driven by a will to create and defend socialism in Russia, ideology was the guiding 
light and inspiration for Joseph Stalin’s policies and practices of the 1930s.4 For him, the revolution 
did not end when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917; Stalin continued employing wartime 
measures well into the late 1930s, seeking to eliminate those he believed to be 
counterrevolutionaries and enemies of the state.  
Scholars have stressed the importance of ideology in the historical development of modern 
Russia.5 The Bolsheviks employed considerable resources to disseminate their ideology, 
                                                          
2 Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 99-100, 20-21. 
3 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 
16. 
4 In this paper, my focus is on the Great Terror. As a result, I am dealing primarily with the connection between 
ideology and violence. But mass repression is only one aspect of Stalin’s policies of the 1930s. As demonstrated in 
works such as Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization, state building and the creation of a 
new type of society occupied the highest priority. The blood purges were meant to safeguard the Party’s ultimate 
goal of building socialism in Russia. To fully understand the Great Terror, it is necessary to be mindful of this goal 
and the policies employed throughout the 1930s that sought to realize the utopian dream. 
5 For political historians like Martin Malia and Richard Pipes, ideology was a primary factor. Even the revisionists, 
while shifting the focus from political to social and cultural forces, accept the argument that ideology played a 
significant role in the history of the Soviet Union.  
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constructing an enormous propaganda machine, with 50,000 activists by 1918 controlling 
newspapers, posters, films, and agitation trains.6 For leading Party members as well as ordinary 
citizens, ideology was a living force, providing meaning and purpose, directing action and 
influencing behavior. In the Soviet Union, individual action, or agency, was produced by and 
dynamically interacted with ideology.7 Bolshevism shrouded itself with ideology. From the 
revolutionary symbolism inherent in the red flag, suggesting and evoking thoughts of life-blood 
and heroic sacrifice, to the sacred texts of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the prevailing idea expressed 
was that the Party possessed a consecrated, esoteric knowledge – the scientific worldview of 
historical and dialectical materialism, the Marxist-Leninist ideology.8 
I argue that ideology is the driving force of history. As an assemblage of ideas and ideals 
grounded in explicit practices, ideology impelled the Great Terror. I do not suggest a dichotomy 
between ideas and circumstances, but rather an interconnectedness and mutual inclusiveness. On 
its own, ideology, although potentially offensive and objectionable, is generally innocuous, but 
becomes a dynamic, and often deadly force when intersected with volatile geopolitical and 
domestic circumstances. Demanding a response, circumstances activate ideology, generating the 
practices and policies that ensure the realization of ideas and ideals.9 Circumstances also transform 
ideologies, as seen in the Russian Civil War, when Bolshevism transformed from a Russianized 
Marxism into a radicalized and militarized Leninism.10 A similar process occurred during the Great 
Terror, when the circumstances of the 1930s transformed Leninism into Stalinism. The vison 
                                                          
6 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, Volume 1 (New York: Penguin, 2014), 290-292. 
7 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 11-13. 
8 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times – Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 16-19. 
9 I am using the idea of circumstances to represent the geopolitical and domestic context. This chapter deals 
specifically with ideology, while the following chapter on the interwar crisis focusses on circumstances. 
10 This process of radicalization, which resulted from circumstances unique to Russia, is crucial for understanding 
the differences between Marxism and Leninism.  
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remained the same – the realization of a socialist society in Russia – but the circumstances 
necessitated dissimilar and distinct policies and practices.11 From Marxism to Leninism to 
Stalinism, there occurred both subtle and profound changes in ideas and applications. The 
question, however, is not if Leninism was a departure from Marxism, or if Stalin was an aberration, 
but rather what were the particular circumstances that resulted in Stalinism and how did this variant 
of Soviet ideology contribute to the Great Terror.  
 
“the lifeblood of revolution” 
 What is ideology? The meaning of the word seems to change depending on who is using 
it and the context in which it is being used. Despite the challenges in establishing a concise 
definition, it is a crucial feature of political life, allowing people to make sense of the world and 
enabling them to interpret facts, events, and social phenomena.12 In its most basic sense, ideology 
is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that guide public policy and organize the political 
community.13 Ideology, as a vital feature of political life and a powerful tool of political discourse, 
is eternally linked with politics. When seeking to establish historical causation, it is more 
appropriate to think in terms of political ideologies rather than exploring an either ideology or 
politics scenario.14 
                                                          
11 Although both Lenin and Stalin used the secret police (the Cheka and the NKVD) to initiate murderous policies in 
the Red Terror and the Great Terror, Lenin never directed these policies at Party members. This is not to say that 
such actions would have repulsed Lenin, but rather that the circumstances of the early 1920s did not necessitate 
such actions. 
12 Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2-3. 
13 Freeden, 32. 
14 This is Freeden’s approach in Ideology: A Very Short Introduction. 
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One of the most significant complications for the modern Russian historian is 
characterizing ideology and explaining its role in Soviet history.15 Modern ideologies are 
“codified, disseminated, and inculcated, often on a mass scale.”16 They are “outlooks deriving 
from disseminated doctrine,” but when it comes to Soviet studies, ideology is often a problem and 
not a solution.17 This is why it is necessary to not only clarify a working definition, but also to 
acknowledge the complexity inherent in such a misunderstood and contested concept. 
Ideology is both a vision of an ideal society and a set of methods employed to realize that 
vision.18 It operates within concrete historical circumstances, changing over time and space, 
reacting and responding in different ways.19 As expressions of both idea and application, 
ideologies are neither abstract conceptions nor static value systems. Ideology played a ubiquitous 
role in the Soviet Union, providing Soviet leaders with the vision of their ideal communist future 
and the practices and policies that would allow them to construct that future.  
Historian Arno J. Mayer argues that ideology is “the lifeblood of revolution.”20 Mayer 
defines ideology as a collective worldview consisting of ideas and principles, expressed in 
numerous forms, including written and spoken, but also through symbols and rituals.21 To realize 
these ideas and principles, action is required. Ideology is action-oriented, employing specific 
practices designed to actualize political ideals. Many scholars have defined ideology as “political 
theory especially designed to direct political conduct and practices.”22  
                                                          
15 Michael David-Fox, “On the Primacy of Ideology: Soviet Revisionists and Holocaust Deniers (In Response to 
Martin Malia),” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no.1 (Winter 2004), 82. 
16 David-Fox, 103. 
17 David-Fox, 103-105. 
18 Steven A. Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 10. 
19 Barnes, 10-11. 
20 Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 34. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Michael Freeden, “Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices,” Political Studies 48 (2000), 303. 
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The most important feature of ideology is that it is observable in concrete action and 
empirically evident activity.23 Ideas are expressed in actions.24 With this understanding, 
explorations of ideologies must be based on empirical data, because they concern concrete 
manifestations of political thought.25 Ideology is not the obscure and nebulous ramblings of 
academic theorists. As the union of idea and action, thought and practice, the study of ideology is 
the most important method historians have for understanding the causation behind historical 
phenomena. One reason for this is because ideology transcends divisions between political, social, 
and cultural history. Ideology is the driving force behind them all, inspiring and affecting all the 
various levels of a society and all the systems and structures that make up that society.26  
This understanding of ideology, as action-oriented, is crucial for exploring Lenin, the 
revolutionary period, and the age of Stalin. For Lenin, theory and practice were “inextricably 
linked.”27 The same was certainly true for Stalin, as every policy he initiated – collectivization, 
rapid industrialization, cultural revolution, and the Great Terror – was fundamentally grounded in 
his understanding of and devotion to Marxism-Leninism.  
 
Marxism – “by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannons” 
Based on my definition of ideology – an assemblage of ideas and ideals grounded in 
explicit practices and policies – Marxism seems more like political philosophy than ideology. In 
works like the Manifesto of the Communist Party, there is a theoretical interpretation of History, 
                                                          
23 Freeden, Ideology, 23. 
24 Ibid, 29. 
25 Ibid, 76. 
26 Louis Althusser referred to the ideological state apparatuses that immersed societies, including religious, legal, 
family, and cultural structures, along with mass media and the educational system. See Freeden, Ideology, 25-30. 
27 James Ryan, “Lenin’s The State and Revolution and Soviet State Violence: A Textual Analysis,” Revolutionary 
Russia 20, no.2 (2007), 152. 
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but not a set of concrete practices that would bring forth its next stage.28 When Karl Marx and 
Fredrick Engels wrote their Manifesto in 1847, Russia was an agrarian society, not yet 
industrialized, and defined by a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional diversity. The Manifesto 
argued that History moved through stages of development, with each stage marked by opposing 
forces that resolved in higher states, moving humanity forward to its ultimate destiny and most 
advanced stage of perfection. The feudal age, for example, saw the opposing forces of masters and 
serfs lead to the epoch of capitalism, where the two opposing forces were the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. In every stage, the driving force was class struggle – the oppressor and the oppressed, 
the exploiter and the exploited, locked in an epic struggle for survival. Violence and revolution 
often powered the transformation from one stage to the next, as the French Revolution moved 
History from the age of feudalism to the age of capitalism. 
Marx and Engels defined the bourgeoisie as the class of modern capitalists. They were the 
owners of the means of production (the factories, machines, and equipment) and the employers of 
wage labor. Their historical purpose was to move civilization from seclusion and self-sufficiency 
to globalization and to subject the country to towns and cities, rescuing populations from “the 
idiocy of rural life.”29 All nations would be forced to industrialize or face extinction at the hands 
of the bourgeois capitalists. Their defining characteristic was a brutal exploitation of the workers, 
the proletariat, the class of modern wage laborers who sold their labor in order to survive. They 
were nothing more than an appendage of the machine, slaves of the bourgeoisie. Their work was 
dull and monotonous, and their wages were unbearably low. But like the bourgeoisie, the 
                                                          
28 Following Koestler, Arendt (in The Origins of Totalitarianism), and others, I am capitalizing “History” to stress its 
importance in Soviet ideology as a personified force with a will and telos all its own. 
29 Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marxists Internet Archive, 1848. 
<www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017). 
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proletariat also had a historical purpose to fulfill. As urban populations grew, the proletariat would 
increase in number, begin to form trade unions, and eventually organize into a political party.  
In time, the proletariat would violently overthrow their bourgeois oppressors, destroying 
all existing social conditions and moving History into its next and highest stage, socialism: “the 
violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.”30 This 
was inevitable. The socialists would then abolish private property, eradicate religious practices, 
and bring to an end national differences and antagonisms. Civilization would become a communist 
utopia, where class struggle would no longer exist because there would no longer be any classes – 
all would be equal. This would be an age of harmony and justice.31  
Michael Freeden, a leading authority on the subject of ideology, calls communism a 
“perverted offshoot of the socialist tradition.”32 Most modern Marxists make similar distinctions, 
separating socialist theory from the violence and brutality of Stalinism and Maoism. But many 
scholars and historians see the seeds of terror evident in the writings of Marx and Engels. French 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote that Marxism “is a theory of violence and a justification 
of terror.”33 Marx was well aware of the role violence played in all major historical changes, noting 
that throughout history “conquest, enslavement, murder-cum-robbery, in short Gewalt (force, 
violence) play[ed] a preeminent role.”34 Marx and Engels believed that to reach and defend the 
next and highest stage of historical development, socialism, Gewalt would necessarily play a 
leading role. The proletariat would violently rise up against their oppressors, fulfilling the logic of 
History and redeeming humanity. This was the orthodoxy set down by Marx and Engels.35  
                                                          
30 Marx and Engels. 
31 Marx and Engels. 
32 Freeden, Ideology, 91. Freeden is referring specifically to the Soviet variant of communism. 
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, quoted in Mayer, 111. 
34 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, quoted in Mayer, 77. 
35 Ryan, 158. 
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In his work On Authority, Engels openly advocated the use of terror. Speaking of 
revolution, he said, “one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of 
rifles, bayonets, and cannons.” And when it came to defending the revolution, “the victorious party 
must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries.”36 The 
historical theory of Marx and Engels, a theory advocating mass exclusion, was practically applied 
by Lenin and Stalin on the ground level in the Red Terror and the Great Terror. For both Lenin 
and Stalin, the words of Marx were clear and concise, not open to debate or interpretation: “there 
is only one way in which the murderous death agonies of the old society and the bloody birth 
throes of the new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, and that way is 
revolutionary terror.”37  
The socialist society described by Marx and Engels is a world peopled by a politically 
conscious proletariat. Other groups have no place in the socialist future; they will simply “decay 
and disappear.”38 The peasants are not revolutionary, but rather conservative and reactionary. And 
as rural communities gave way to industrial cities, the class of peasants would be replaced by an 
army of urban workers. They would eventually disappear into the sands of time. So too would the 
small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, and the artisan. The most dangerous class, the 
lumpenproletariat, the “social scum” and “passively rotting mass,” would, like the others, wither 
away and die.39 These individuals, according to Marx and Engels, were the lowest of the low, the 
criminals, beggars, prostitutes, and thieves. They are incapable of achieving consciousness, so they 
too are excluded from the next stage of History. Because religion would be abolished, the future 
                                                          
36 Engels, On Authority, quoted in Ryan, 161. 
37 Karl Marx, “The Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1848. 
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had no place for priests and clergy. Socialism is a world without peasants, criminals, small 
businessmen, and religious believers. Society is made up of educated workers, united in purpose 
and resolve. And there are no longer multitudes of individuals with their own cultures, beliefs, and 
values. Nationalities and national identities would dissolve and merge into the collective, socialist 
body; into a homogenous proletariat identity. 
Much of this sounds like a natural and organic process, a vision of progress where certain 
social groups are either naturally transformed or slowly disappear over time. This is certainly a 
plausible argument based on a reading of the Manifesto alone. In this particular work, notions of 
direct violence are specifically focused on the bourgeoisie. But a closer reading of other works, 
when read alongside the Manifesto, suggest not a slow and natural process, but rather a passionate 
appeal for violence and exclusion. When Marx speaks of the death agonies of the old society, he 
is arguing for the elimination of all that represents the old-world order, including specific social 
groups that have no role to play in the new-world order. These groups will naturally vanish and 
decay over time, but to shorten and simplify the process, revolutionary terror is necessary.40 
Furthermore, the social groups in question – the middle class, for example, represented by 
shopkeepers, artisans, peasants, and small manufacturers – is conservative and not revolutionary. 
The lumpenproletariat is reactionary.41 As conservatives and reactionaries, these individuals 
present a direct threat to the proletariat. It would be a dire mistake to allow History to naturally 
take its course, as these groups and individuals would fight to the death, preventing the proletariat 
from establishing their dictatorship. As Engels cautioned, the rule of the proletariat would not 
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come by patiently awaiting the promised utopia; victory could only be secured by using violence 
and terror against reactionary forces.42 
 
 Leninism – “the tribune of the people” 
In 1899, fifty years after the writing of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Vladimir 
Lenin published “Our Programme,” his interpretation of the doctrines of Marx and Engels. Lenin, 
and other Marxists, believed that Marxism transformed socialism from a utopian fantasy into a 
pragmatic science. But Marx’s theory had only laid the foundational stone, providing the general 
guiding principles. It still needed to be developed and elaborated. For Lenin, class struggle meant 
both economic struggle against the capitalists and political struggle against the state. The task of 
men like Lenin, educated and socially aware, was to form a vanguard that would lead and organize 
the class struggle of the proletariat. The goal would be the conquest of political power by the 
proletariat and the creation of a socialist society.43  
A few years later, in 1902, Lenin wrote “What is to Be Done?” further developing his 
revolutionary ideas. The central problem for the proletariat was a lack of consciousness, an utter 
blindness of their oppression and enslavement. Consciousness, Lenin believed, must be brought to 
the working class from without, by a group of professional revolutionaries, the vanguard that he 
alluded to in “Our Programme.” Without leadership, without the tribune of the people, “who is 
able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression,” the workers would settle for 
economic concessions, never achieving the political power that was necessary to move History 
into its next stage of development.44 This vanguard would unleash propaganda and agitation 
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43 V.I. Lenin, “Our Programme,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1899. <www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017). 
44 Ibid. 
26 
 
 
 
among all strata of the people, resulting in the political consciousness of the proletariat that was 
the prerequisite for social transformation.45 
On its own, ideology does not cause violence and terror. There has to be an intersection of 
ideology and circumstance, like there was in Russia in 1905 when Marxist ideology and domestic 
crisis collided.46 With revolution in Russia, the horrors of Bloody Sunday, the disaster of the war 
with Japan, and demands across the country for social reforms, Lenin’s ideas on political violence 
began to take shape. Lenin interpreted the crisis through a Marxist lens, with his commitment to 
class struggle, his belief that History progresses dialectically through revolutionary violence, and 
his acceptance of the legitimacy and justness of revolutionary violence.47 Developed within the 
Russian context, a Russianized Marxism evolved and, once filtered through Lenin’s unique 
personality, became a militant ideology, uncompromising on the necessity of violence in creating 
social and political change.48  
Consideration of the dialectical process is important for understanding the political role of 
violence during the Civil War period. Lenin believed, as did many Marxists of the time, that 
revolutionary violence would negate reactionary violence.49 Violence, then, was both ethical and 
moral, because its function and purpose was to overcome violence itself. As a Marxist, Lenin was 
a theorist of the dialectical concept of peace through violence – a moral violent struggle against all 
violence for the liberation of all peoples.50 The only way to overcome bourgeois violence, Lenin 
came to believe, was through revolutionary civil war.51 
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Lenin’s Marxism militarized class struggle, praising civil warfare and rejecting a more 
compromising and gradual revolutionary path. Lenin believed, along with Marx and Marxist 
theoretician Karl Kautsky, that revolutionary violence had a progressive function.52 Only an armed 
insurrection could overcome the autocracy.53 Social transformation demanded violence. As Lenin 
wrote in 1906, “We would be deceiving ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses 
the necessity of a desperate bloody war of extermination.”54 With Marxism filtered through the 
Russian experience and Lenin’s personality, a more militant and militarized ideology emerged.55 
Leninism advocated political violence as both moral and necessary, the only means of affecting 
social transformation. Revolutionary violence would end reactionary violence and overcome 
bourgeois oppression, moving society forward into the next stage of historical development.56  
  
Stalinism and the Enemies of History  
Because Stalin’s worldview so closely resembled Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the Soviet 
system throughout the 1930s, or Stalinism, was a continuation and culmination of Marxism-
Leninism. The worldview did not change, but new circumstances – including the rise of fascist 
Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan, along with capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union – 
demanded new practices and policies. Stalinism was both an ideology and a political system, 
encompassing the entirety of Soviet institutions, structures, and rituals.57 Stalin fulfilled and 
completed the work that Lenin began. It was Lenin, and not Stalin, who began the process of using 
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the tools intended for total war for revolutionary politics and revolutionary transformation.58 It is 
important to recognize and understand the legacy of brutality that led to Stalinism. The 
unprecedented violence and chaos that engulfed Russia during the years of world war, civil war, 
and revolution, had a lasting impact on the Soviet state. As historian Peter Holquist argues when 
discussing the years 1914 to 1921, “many of the features we presume to be Stalinist in fact were 
inscribed into the Soviet system at this time.”59 
The only way to understand the fate of men like Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko, one of 
the nearly 700,000 people executed by NKVD officers during the Great Terror, is to analyze and 
scrutinize Soviet ideology.60 The process involves asking who were the victims of the Great Terror 
and how were they portrayed and presented in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The first 
wave of victims consisted primarily of Party members and military officers, the Bolshevik “old 
guard.” The next wave, the mass and national operations, included former kulaks, criminals, and 
other “anti-Soviet elements,” along with non-Russian contingents across the Soviet Union. By 
examining each group, it becomes evident just how essential ideology was in unleashing the mass 
violence and repression of the Great Terror. It also demonstrates how ideology transcends the 
theoretical and expresses itself in the practical, which is to say that Soviet ideology is empirically 
perceptible in phenomena such as the Great Terror. With every arrest and every execution, we see 
both the ideal and the policies employed to realize the ideal.  
  
 
                                                          
58 Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard 
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“I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot”     
The first wave of the Great Terror targeted the “old guard” of Bolshevik elites, military 
officers, the NKVD leadership core, and industrial managers. The NKVD, under the new 
leadership and new direction of Nikolai Ezhov, executed approximately 40,000 individuals from 
the old guard between 1936 and 1938. The executions followed Stalin’s address to the graduates 
of the Red Army Academies on 4 May 1935. Speaking of the current state of affairs in the Soviet 
Union, Stalin railed, “We need people who have mastered technique” and “We lack people with 
sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it.” For Stalin, 
the situation was dire: “We now have a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of 
harnessing technique and advancing it.” He was speaking of all sectors of Soviet society – the 
factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, army, and transport system. “We inherited from the 
past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country,” Stalin told the new graduates, 
“with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms.” The task was “to transfer this 
country from medieval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture.” This address 
was not intended simply to inspire the graduates with a sense of purpose for their futures. Stalin 
believed war was coming and the Soviet Union was not prepared. If they did not act in the present, 
they would “become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.” But, Stalin concluded, “if we 
have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport, and the army – our country will 
be invincible.”61 The ideal, then, was to produce educated cadres who would be loyal to the Party 
and help Stalin continue his quest to create and defend socialism in Russia.  
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Stalin believed that the Soviet Union did not have the properly trained and educated cadres 
that were necessary to lead the country forward along its path to a radiant future. The new 
graduates, new products of Stalin’s cultural revolution, would lead the way, helping Stalin to build 
and defend socialism in the Soviet Union. Through war and revolution, the old guard had fulfilled 
their purpose. But now they  lacked the skills necessary to advance the Soviet state. Like so many 
others, they had no place in the future utopia. In time, History itself would wash them away – but 
one thing that Stalin did not have was time, with the certainty of war approaching, so he sped up 
the process by initiating the first wave of purges. There were certainly other factors to consider, 
all of which made Stalin’s decision that much easier. In his address, he spoke of the opponents 
who wanted to retreat from industrialization and collectivization, comrades who opposed “the plan 
of advance.” As many historians have noted, based on Trotsky’s notorious remark that “The Party 
is always right,” there could be no voice of dissent.62 The logic was simple – those who opposed 
the Party line were enemies of the Party, and those who were enemies of the Party were necessarily 
enemies of History.  
During his concluding speech at the end of the first Moscow show trial in July 1936, state 
prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky said, “before us are criminals, dangerous, hardened, cruel and 
ruthless towards our people, towards our ideals, towards the leaders of our struggle, the leaders of 
the toilers of the whole world… I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot – every one of 
them!”63 The accused, loyal members of the old guard for decades, confessed to absurd plots to 
murder Stalin and restore capitalism. Their real crime was of course Stalin’s conviction that they 
could no longer be trusted and had nothing left to offer the Party and the Soviet Union. Their 
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leadership positions throughout all sectors of society needed to be filled by new, technically 
educated cadres. They needed to be filled by individuals loyal to Stalin’s ideological vision. When 
Ezhov addressed the Central Committee in 1936, he said, “We shall pull up this Trotskyist-
Zinovievist slime by the root and physically annihilate them.”64 In Soviet parlance, this meant 
anyone who opposed Stalin’s path to the radiant future. Within the Party, the NKVD, and the 
military, there were many who, like Trotsky, saw a different path for the Soviet Union. For Stalin, 
this opposition was a criminal act. All critics became counterrevolutionaries.65 
 
“Ruthless war on the kulaks!”  
In “Comrade Workers,” composed in 1918, Lenin wrote about Bolshevik enemies both at 
home and abroad. When dealing with internal enemies, his entire focus was on the kulaks. He 
called them the “rabid foes of the Soviet government,” “the most brutal, callous and savage 
exploiters,” “bloodsuckers,” and “vampires.” He referred to them as leeches who have “sucked the 
blood of the working people” and who have “prepared to strangle and massacre hundreds of 
thousands of workers.” According to Lenin, under the stress and strain of civil war, these 
“avaricious, bloated and bestial kulaks” would align with the landowners and foreign capitalists, 
seeking to restore power to the tsars, priests, and bourgeoisie. He declared that peace and 
compromise were impossible, that the proletariat must ruthlessly destroy the “predatory kulak.” 
“Ruthless war on the kulaks!” Lenin pronounced, “Death to them!”66 
For Marx, wealthy peasants, or kulaks, like all peasants, would be one of the unfortunate 
classes that simply vanished off the face of the earth. His future socialist society consisted of 
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workers, not peasants, a class that belonged only to the earlier stages of historical development. 
Stalin synthesizes the teachings of Marx and Lenin, believing those who had been dekulakized, 
men like Stepan Prokhorovich Stashchenko, could never play a role in the future utopia he was 
constructing in the Soviet Union. Once a kulak, he may have reasoned, always a kulak. Following 
Lenin’s lead, Stalin believed these former kulaks would instantly turn traitor in the event of war. 
They would become spies for the enemy, doing everything in their power to restore capitalism in 
Russian and destroy the Party apparatus. The kulak nature was conservative and reactionary, not 
revolutionary. Twenty years after Lenin’s “Comrade Workers,” Stalin too declared ruthless war 
on the kulaks when he approved NKVD Order 00447, launching the mass operations.67 
Hannah Arendt said that Marx turned Hegel on his head, replacing the Hegelian dialectics 
of thesis and antithesis with the class categories of bourgeoisie and proletariat and the centrality 
of human thought with human labor.68 Similarly, Lenin turned Marx on his head, applying 
conceptions of bourgeois society in an early-20th century Russia that was only partially 
industrialized, with over 90% of its population consisting of peasants. To correspond with the 
Marxist doctrines, Lenin needed a bourgeois oppressor and a proletarian oppressed. He found such 
distinctions by looking to Russia’s peasantry. The prosperous, wealthier peasants became the 
bourgeoisie while the poor peasants became the exploited and enslaved workers. Those in the 
middle represented the petty bourgeoisie. As Aaron B. Retish writes in Russia’s Peasants in 
Revolution: Citizenship, Identity, and the Creation of the Soviet State, 1914-1922, “From Lenin’s 
notions of capitalist development in the Russian countryside, Bolsheviks divided the village into 
three overarching typologies – poor (bedniaki), middle (seredniaki), and rich (kulaki) peasants – 
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and so imposed class identities on peasants that did not exist as such before.”69 The Bolsheviks 
quickly accepted these artificial divisions without question. Stalin became the guardian of the poor 
peasants, proclaiming, “the main forces of our revolution are the workers and the poor peasants.”70 
From the beginning, for both Lenin and Stalin, the kulaks represented the bourgeois exploiters, 
enemies of the state, a class that needed to be annihilated. Stalin’s collectivization initiated the 
process; his Great Terror completed it.  
 
“counterrevolutionary outrage”  
When discussing the lumpenproletariat, Marx and Engels referred to them as the “bribed 
tool of reactionary intrigue.”71 As a group, the lumpenproletariat, lacking political consciousness, 
void of any understanding of loyalty and allegiance, could be paid off by the foreign capitalists. 
They were a threat to Stalin and the Soviet Union if a second Great War should erupt. And even if 
there was peace, because they could never become a part of the working class, the 
lumpenproletariat needed to be eliminated from the body politic. This group was composed of 
habitual criminals, prostitutes, beggars, wanderers, gypsies, and anyone else believed to be 
incapable of positively contributing to society. In the years leading up to Stalin’s purges, 
authorities began expelling these groups from urban centers such as Moscow and Leningrad. In 
1935, the authorities in Leningrad arrested and expelled 18,000 women accused of prostitution. 
Most were sent to labor camps.72 The habitual criminals, because of their “corrupting influence,” 
were also arrested and sent to labor camps. This group was classified as “repeat offenders who are 
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part of the professional criminal world.”73 Other anti-Soviet elements included priests and 
members of the clergy.  
In 1937, NKVD order 00447 specifically targeted criminals, focusing on bandits, armed 
robbers, pocket thieves, and recidivist criminals.74 As early as 1933, Stalin had declared theft to 
be a “counterrevolutionary outrage.”75 Even stealing a loaf of bread was deemed a 
counterrevolutionary act against the state. NKVD officers quickly began arresting individuals in 
major urban areas suspected of criminal activity. At the same time, the militsiia began to purge the 
railways and train stations of criminal elements, apprehending criminals and homeless children, 
specifically targeting those involved in theft, robbery, and hooliganism.76  
One of the problems historians face when dealing with Soviet understandings of 
criminality, especially when researching the 1930s, is finding historical evidence to support their 
arguments. Because of Stalin’s proclivity for secrecy, much of the record became a state secret, as 
decisions and official policies never made it past the leader and his inner circle.77 Some of the laws 
from the early 1930s did become public record, such as the infamous Law of August 7, 1932, that 
declared state and socialist property to be “holy and inviolable.” Draconian punishments awaited 
those convicted of theft. Juvenile delinquency was criminalized in 1935, as was abortion in 1936. 
Stalin played the central role in these initiatives.78 Clearly, a pattern was emerging. Stalin’s 
hardline approach to criminality reached its peak in 1937 with order 00447. With the Great Terror, 
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Stalin specifically targeted social marginals and former criminals, hoping to eliminate them from 
the Soviet Union.79  
The concern, however, for the historian of the Great Terror, is to acknowledge the 
complexity regarding Party ideas on criminals in the 1930s. There is a body of literature, most 
often associated with Gulag studies, that suggests a belief in criminal redemption and 
rehabilitation. At all stages of Soviet history, we see authorities resorting to both “the carrot and 
the stick.” We should not expect things to be different in the 1930s, even at a time of extreme 
social and political stress. But as Steven Barnes demonstrates, the “threshold of redeemabilty” was 
significantly higher during the Terror.80 For those sent to the Gulag as counterrevolutionaries, the 
possibility of redemption essentially disappeared throughout this period. Certainly, more research 
needs to be done. 
 
“enemy nations”  
An idea inherent to Bolshevik thought was the belief that “non-Russians were uneducated, 
unenlightened, and culturally backwards.”81 Nationalities, or ethnicities, were neither essential nor 
eternal; they were merely manifestations of the capitalist stage of historical development.82 Ethnic 
populations would eventually shed their national identities and merge with the new Soviet order. 
Assimilation was certain.83 Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, one of the most 
important tasks was finding a way to affect this assimilation quickly and efficiently. Trotsky 
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believed non-Russians were wild and ignorant, incapable of discerning the Russian language and 
the teachings of socialism.84 Others believed this cultural backwardness could be overcome 
through education, leading to successful integration into the larger polity.85 They advocated for a 
state-sponsored evolutionism – to usher the nationalities “through the Marxist timeline of historical 
development.”86 Clans and tribes would become nationalities, nationalities would become socialist 
nations, and socialist nations would become communists.87 The smaller would merge with the 
larger, “eventually resulting in the consolidation of clans, tribes, and nationalities into Soviet 
socialist nations.”88  
But the Soviet Union rejected any model associated with imperial Russia or modern 
capitalist nation-states.89 The Bolsheviks saw nations through a Marxist lens, in class terms. They 
equated Russia with the bourgeoisie and the national minorities with the proletariat. They saw in 
this equation the oppressed versus the oppressor, the exploited versus the exploiter. The 
Bolsheviks, firmly standing on the “correct” side of History, represented the proletariat, the 
exploited and oppressed. They advocated an evolutionary process of assimilation, where 
eventually class consciousness would triumph over national consciousness. This process would 
occur naturally over time as minorities, such as the Udmurt, for example, would move from a sense 
of Udmurt national identity, to consciousness of oppression, to a final stage of proletariat identity.90 
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The Bolsheviks initiated programs that were designed to support this three-step process. 
They provided social and cultural resources through programs known as korenizatsiia. Rather than 
using violence and repression to force assimilation, the Bolsheviks encouraged the development 
of national identity. They gave national minorities their own territories. They would use the local 
languages and dialects to disseminate socialist ideology, printing the Communist Manifesto in 
countless tongues. The goal was to move the national minorities not towards Russian culture, but 
towards Soviet culture.91 Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, believed that the granting of 
national territories would result in the crumbling of national identity and the awakening of class 
identity.92 But the theoretical ideal of an evolutionary process towards assimilation proved to be 
extremely difficult to implement on the ground level. 
The dream of national evolution was seriously challenged during the Civil War. Like the 
revolution, this was a Great Russian affair, as many of the border nationalities never leant their 
support to the Bolsheviks. In Finland and the Baltic states, the “Whites” had full control. The 
lesson was not lost on Stalin – some nationalities, with their autonomous sentiment, could not be 
trusted. During the Civil War, many sided with the bourgeois governments.93 Certainly they would 
do the same thing again if given the opportunity. By the mid-1930s, Stalin was convinced that the 
nationalities were essentially “enemy nations” connected to foreign states.94 National evolution 
had failed. The ethnicities were incapable of assimilation. The national operations were designed 
to eliminate the ethnic populations who were most likely to ally themselves with the enemy. Stalin 
wished to destroy these contingents, a potential “fifth column,” before it had the chance to form. 
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The Ethics of Terror   
Martin Malia has called the Soviet worldview “a totalizing ideology buttressed by terror.”95 
Violence was an essential tool for social transformation.96 Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were 
inspired by the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. In “Lesson of the Commune” Lenin 
wrote, “there are times when the interests of the proletariat call for ruthless extermination of its 
enemies.”97 The reason the Commune failed was because the revolutionaries had failed to destroy 
their enemies. This was the lesson that Lenin would remember the rest of his life; a lesson that he 
would pass on to his Bolshevik comrades. Its practical application is seen in the Red Terror of 
1918, and certainly in Stalin’s blood purges of the 1930s. When it came to warfare, Lenin believed 
in its absolute necessity to affect real and lasting change, writing “We fully regard civil wars, i.e., 
wars waged by the oppressed class against the oppressing class, slaves against slave-holders, serfs 
against land-owners, and wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as legitimate, progressive and 
necessary.”98 To give birth to the future, enemies of the present would have to be destroyed. This 
was not only necessary, it was a moral imperative because enemies of the Party were enemies of 
History, and the Bolsheviks were the manifestation of History’s will on earth. As the Chekists said, 
“history would forgive an excess of harshness but not of weakness.”99  
The idea of violence as an appropriate and necessary tool was an integral part of Soviet 
ideology. Disputes with Stalin over the correct path for the Soviet Union centered on various 
programs and processes, but even the opposition accepted and encouraged the use of violence as 
a means to achieving political ends. Trotsky wrote, “Arguments to the effect that all violence, 
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including revolutionary violence, is evil and that communists therefore ought not engage in the 
‘glorification’ of armed struggle and the revolutionary army, amount to a philosophy worthy of 
Quakers and the old maids of the Salvation Army.”100 Violence was compulsory to cleanse the 
Soviet Union of enemies, obligatory to purify the state and wash away the adversaries of socialism.   
Leninism and Stalinism were both teleological ethical systems. When Western scholars 
apply their deontological understandings of morality to events such as the Red Terror and the Great 
Terror, the result is an explicit and unequivocal condemnation, usually in the form of a personal 
attack on either Lenin or Stalin. But just as the historian must keep in mind historical circumstances 
when analyzing the past, so too must he or she be mindful of different ethical systems. In the 
teleological system, actions have no intrinsic value or worth. The standard of right and wrong, 
good and evil, is the comparative consequences of the available actions.  An action is good if it 
produces the best consequences. Moral judgements follow from the consequences of actions. What 
matters is the end result, not the means employed to realize that end. Nothing is more important 
than the goal, the telos. The criterion of morality lies in an abstract, nonmoral value that results 
from action, such as equality, justice, or welfare.101 This reasoning allowed both Lenin and Stalin 
to justify the use of mass violence and repression. 
Stalin’s goal, the building and defending of socialism in Russia, a society defined by justice 
and equality, was the quintessential standard. The actions he took, through his leadership core and 
NKVD officers, may have been morally repulsive in a deontological ethical system, but in the 
Soviet Union in the 1930s, where society was grounded in a teleological system, these actions 
were largely regarded as morally necessary to defend the revolution and save the Soviet Union 
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from internal and external enemies. Specific ethical systems, along with understandings of 
epistemology and political philosophy, are all aspects of modern ideologies. This is something 
many historians must not forget when asking the most important historical question: Why?  
Hannah Arendt understood the primacy of ideology in the Soviet experiment, the “idea” of 
class struggle resolving in a socialist utopia as Stalin’s raison d’être.  The purpose was the end 
goal, the telos. According to the ideological principles that informed Stalin’s actions as leader of 
the Soviet Union, the present is merely a stage of some further development. History is governed 
by a law of movement, a linear movement that culminates with the establishment of a socialist 
civilization. Terror is a tool making it possible for the force of History to move freely through 
mankind, unconstrained by spontaneous human action. If law is the law of movement of the 
suprahuman force of History, then the use of terror is lawful.102  
Stalin’s actions were aimed at the acceleration of the movement of History. He sacrificed 
the “parts” for the sake of the “whole”; eliminated individuals for the sake of the species. History 
was destined to move from capitalism to socialism – Stalin’s purges were designed to speed up 
this process by eliminating individuals and groups that could potentially slow down and hinder 
historical progression and social transformation. 
Terror, as a tool, is only a servant of historical development. History has already 
pronounced the death sentence on the “dying classes,” state terror simply executes that sentence 
in a swifter and more efficient manner. Opposition to this process is not permitted. Elimination of 
the enemies of History is obligatory and compulsory. Anyone who stands in the way of the 
historical process is guilty. For Stalin, this meant anyone who opposed the Party, anyone who 
could potentially fight to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, and anyone deemed incapable of 
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contributing to a socialist society.  The reasoning was explicit and precise: The Party represents 
the logic of History; Stalin represents the Party; if you oppose Stalin, then you oppose the Party; 
if you oppose the Party, then you oppose the logic of History; and if you oppose the logic of 
History, then you are a counterrevolutionary enemy of History. In this system, a lack of fealty 
necessitated imprisonment or execution – the accused were not simply opposing Stalin’s will, they 
were opposing the logic of History.103 
In the Soviet system, not only did the end justify the means, the end was often achieved 
through violence.104 Lenin had no scruples about using violence to achieve the end goal of 
socialism. Violence was, in fact, intrinsic to Lenin’s philosophy of revolution.105 The same can be 
said for Stalin. Stalin shared Lenin’s system of teleological ethics, a system both men derived from 
Marx. What mattered was not the individual, but society, and “to steer this society in the necessary 
direction is the ultimate act of true morality for a Marxist.” In Marxist theory, human beings are 
nothing more than instruments of the historical process.106 With the Great Terror, Stalin was 
attempting to move the Soviet Union in the necessary direction. 
Francine Hirsch writes, “The Bolsheviks took from Karl Marx the ideas that there was a 
“logic” (or “telos”) to history, and that it was possible to get on the “right side” of the historical 
process by carefully interpreting its inner dynamics and figuring out where one stood on the 
timeline of development.”107 Stalin’s blood purges were an attempt to put the Soviet Union on the 
“right side” of the historical process, to move his nation in the “correct” direction by eliminating 
those who could potentially undermine the revolution and return Russian to a state of Asiatic 
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backwardness. The socialist project, what was hailed the “culmination of history, the telos of 
human development,”108 entailed radical defensive measures to ensure that counterrevolutionary 
forces could not disrupt the process and initiate a regression in the Soviet Union. It was necessary 
to move forward, in the correct direction, following the logic of history. 
In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, there was one end, one supreme goal: the building and 
defense of socialism. As Malia argues, “everything that did not contribute to achieving this goal 
was ipso facto a hostile element to be purged from the system.”109 In a teleological ethical system, 
this is the moral thing to do – whatever is necessary to achieve the goal. Perhaps several hundred 
thousand individuals would have to die, but Soviet society and Soviet civilization would flourish. 
This was the logic of History, the very heart of Bolshevik ideology, expressed under Lenin in the 
Red Terror and under Stalin in the Great Terror.  
Ideology was the guiding light and driving force behind Stalin’s terror. His concern was 
with the process of becoming, the unfolding of historical development. The Great Terror sought to 
cleanse the Soviet Union of those with the potential capacity to disrupt this process. It employed 
mass terror and repression with the goal of eliminating the enemies of History.110  
 
Conclusion 
In the tragedy of Elektra, Sophocles wrote, “The end excuses any evil.” For Stalin, inspired 
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the end was socialism in Russia. The achievement of this goal 
required “the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.”111 Bourgeois conceptions of morality 
would only hinder the drive for revolutionary transformation. At a time of geopolitical uncertainty 
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and domestic strain, there was a synthesis of idea and action, as Stalin and his inner circle sought 
to safeguard the Soviet Union and defend the revolution by eliminating both present and potential 
threats.112 Ideology drove the Great Terror. The Party’s ideal of creating a socialist civilization in 
Russia faced dire threats by the 1930s, both internally and externally. Stalin and his core leadership 
group initiated programs and policies meant to ensure that the will of History would not be 
hindered by reactionary forces. These forces were on the ascendant throughout the interwar period, 
in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and across Eastern Europe. It was an epic struggle 
between the antithetical ideologies of fascism and communism – a struggle for the fate of humanity 
and the future of civilization. Geopolitical circumstances, both foreign and domestic, threatened 
to destroy the Soviet state. Stalin and his leadership group proactively responded to the threats, 
initiating programs designed to safeguard the revolution. And this was the essence of Soviet 
ideology – not only the goal of building socialism in Russia and the vision of creating a communist 
empire of justice, but the specific practices and polices employed to realize the goal and manifest 
the vision. 
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CHAPTER 3 “AFTER THE FLOOD: THE INTERWAR CRISIS AND THE 
RISE OF STALIN” 
 
 
The element of truth behind all of this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not 
gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are 
attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be 
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a 
potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness 
on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his 
consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. 
 
Sigmund Freud 1 
 
The Deluge  
Ten million soldiers died in the First World War. Twenty million more returned home 
wounded or disabled. Millions of young women and children were left widowed or orphaned, cities 
and villages lied in ruins, and disease and starvation ravaged the lands.2 Social, political, and 
cultural destruction quickly followed, as the war annihilated the very foundations of knowledge 
and understanding that had supported life in Europe for millennia, resulting in mass trauma, 
anxiety, and an epistemological crisis that came to define the interwar period. For those who 
survived the devastation, the world they knew, along with the ways in which they understood that 
world, had been swept away by the conflict’s hideous waves of violence and savagery. Many of 
the great empires had fallen, including the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austria-Hungary 
empires that had exercised power and authority throughout the world for centuries.3 With the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, an Islamic state based on a caliphate, shari’ah, and the 
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ulama had vanished, leaving countless Muslims throughout the Middle East in a desperate state of 
bewilderment and confusion.4   
In the wake of the Great War, sixty million people died from famine and disease, as 
tuberculosis and cholera slayed both city and country dwellers. Over fifty million more died 
worldwide from the Spanish Flu.5 The destruction was absolute. The political structures that had 
organized and defined European civilization collapsed. The war even weakened and debilitated 
the great French and British empires. It was a time of unbearable and unimaginable loss. It was 
also a time of economic crisis, as the Great Depression plunged millions worldwide into poverty 
throughout the 1930s. Many intellectuals of the period saw these years as the degeneration and 
disintegration of civilization, and there was an understanding, for both those on the political Left 
and those on the Right, that only strength and force could resolve the crisis.6 
The war was nothing less than cataclysmic, a horrifying deluge of death and destruction 
that swept away tens of millions of lives and the very foundations of European civilization. In 
response to the extraordinary devastation, modern states around the world envisioned utopian 
futures, new world orders defined by either rationality and progress or power and virility. Creating 
a radiant future from the still smoldering rubble entailed much more than rebuilding towns and 
villages or restructuring economies; it meant proclaiming a new way of living, a new system of 
organizing society, and a new method of expressing cultural values. In this environment emerged 
competing and conflicting worldviews, as proponents of fascism, socialism, and democracy fought 
to the death trying to convince the world that their vision for the future of civilization was the one 
and only true path to follow. For this reason, scholars often refer to the interwar period as the “age 
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of ideology.” If the term today has become somewhat abstract and nebulous, in the interwar period 
ideology was the driving force of history. 
The interwar period was a time of profound anxiety. There was a tremendous tension 
between the forces of modernity and tradition. Industrialization and urbanization left people 
uncertain of their place in the world. Science and progress led to war and destruction. The 
Existentialists questioned humanity’s faith in reason, rationality, and progress. The influential 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had seen a crisis born of modernity, and only two decades after 
his death that crisis began to manifest in dark and disturbing ways. Many saw in modernity 
evidence of the decline of European civilization. Gandhi proclaimed modern civilization to be a 
disease with the potential to infect and destroy the entire world, arguing that Western civilization 
was void of both spirituality and morality and that man was a slave to bodily comforts and material 
goods.7 In even darker and more dismal terms, Sigmund Freud argued that man’s primitive, 
reptilian impulses still endured after countless years of evolution. He believed that two 
fundamental forces remained from man’s ancestral past, influencing our actions and driving our 
behavior: sexuality and aggression. Contrary to Enlightenment ideals based on reason and 
rationality, Freud believed man’s nature was inclined towards violence and destruction. Man’s 
aggressive instinct, Freud proclaimed, his “instinct of death” that manifests in ferocity and 
brutality, is antithetical to civilization.8 
With exhilarating visions of utopian futures, the “saviors of civilization” emerged. In Italy, 
Benito Mussolini enthralled the masses. In Germany, Adolf Hitler raged against the “parasites” 
who threatened to devour European culture. And in the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin embarked on 
the creation of the world’s first socialist society, initiating mass industrialization, collectivization, 
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and cultural revolution. It was a global phenomenon, as state leaders, scientists, artists, and 
scholars all sought to reveal their own unique vision of the next stage of History and proclaim the 
specific programs and practices that would ensure the realization of these visions.9  
I argue that a series of potentially devastating foreign and domestic circumstances 
intersected with a militant ideology, resulting in the Great Terror. Domestically, living standards 
in the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated in the interwar period, opposition to Stalinism steadily 
increased after the disastrous results of collectivization and the stress and strain of rapid 
industrialization, and the possible emergence of a “fifth column” all influenced and impacted 
Stalin’s decision to initiate the blood purges. Internationally, the rise of fascism, with its 
categorical insistence on radical expansionism and its explicit condemnation of socialism, posed 
an existential threat to the Soviet experiment. Additionally, tension in the Far East, the Spanish 
Civil War, and capitalist encirclement all posed extreme dangers for the future of the Soviet state. 
And finally, the near cataclysmic destruction of the first world war compelled Stalin, like other 
global leaders, including Mussolini and Hitler, to take decisive action in ensuring the safety and 
security of his people and the future welfare of his state. This was a battle for humanity, a 
momentous clash between progressive and reactionary forces that would determine the fate of 
human civilization. A second great war seemed inevitable. 
By exploring Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler, along with other examples 
of ideologies and practices antithetical to Soviet interests, the significance of the threat to the 
Soviet Union becomes evident. The interwar period saw the rise of the fanatical obsession of the 
leadership cult.10 No two men exemplified this cult more than Mussolini and Hitler. Expounding 
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ideologies that rejected all forms of socialism and liberalism, Italian fascism and Nazism 
denounced egalitarianism, praising instead the inequality of men and nations. Both ideologies were 
fundamentally nationalistic, imperialistic, and fixated on creating new utopian empires based on 
glorious and mythical pasts. The Soviet system of political governance, the predominance of Slavic 
ethnicities, and the rich and fertile lands of the western Soviet Union all made Stalin’s communist 
state a target of fascist aggression.  
 
Italy11  
In Italy, fearful that the future of Western civilization hung in the balance, the fascists 
advocated an ideology bent on overcoming cultural decadence and spiritual degradation.12 Western 
civilization, Mussolini and his followers argued, had become corrupt and decadent following the 
Great War. Intervention was needed to cure the deviant impulses that plagued society and 
immersed it in depravity and dissolution.13 The ideal was ancient Rome, a glorious past when men 
were courageous, vigorous, and virile. Fascist ideology portrayed Mussolini as an artist, shaping 
and molding the population at will.14  
In their first demonstration of brutality, the Italian fascists dealt with a popular uprising in 
Libya by targeting both combatants and civilians. Along with traditional methods of warfare, 
Mussolini’s forces employed systematic terror. By 1932, Italian forces slaughtered an estimated 
100,000 civilians. In 1935, after invading Ethiopia, the Italians bombed Red Cross hospitals and 
used chemical weapons on civilian populations, killing 250,000 Ethiopians. Hundreds of 
                                                          
11 Segments of this section on Italy come from Michael Polano, “Italian Fascism and the Masculine Ideal” (Wayne 
State University, 2016). 
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thousands more suffered from severe illness following the chemical attacks. The assault on 
civilians continued during the Spanish Civil War, when Mussolini sent his troops to support 
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Italian bombers targeted Barcelona specifically because of its 
civilian population, killings scores of innocent men, women, and children in the process.15 
Fascist ideology focused on action, the very antithesis of Enlightenment virtues such as 
reason and rationality. Italian fascists believed in “familial, religious, authoritarian, and legal 
values,” “values that have been attacked and destroyed by the encyclopedic cultural ideas of the 
Enlightenment.”16 Fascism essentially conceived of life in black and white terms, with no gray 
zones and no places for compromise. It was either a resounding yes or a resounding no: The fascists 
said yes to war, struggle, aggression, inequality, imperialism, nationalism, action, and virility; they 
said no to peace, comfort, pacifism, contemplation, egalitarianism, liberalism, and socialism.  
At the core of the Italian fascist belief system was an emphasis on reality as opposed to 
fantasy. Although socialism claimed to be scientific, the fascists argued, it was nothing more than 
a delusion. The entire foundation of socialist ideology was constructed from an economic theory 
that completely ignored the primacy and power of human nature. This nature, as influential 
thinkers such as Freud and Nietzsche contended, was violent and irrational. The fascist ideologues 
abandoned any and all scientific constructions, focusing instead on action and emotion. As a result, 
a clear and distinct fascist ideology never fully developed. What did emerge was often lacking in 
logical validity and riddled with contradictions. But that was really the whole point – they were 
                                                          
15 The numbers in this paragraph come from interviews with various historians in Italian Fascism in Color, 
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concerned with action, not theory. They wanted to create a new Italian empire, not construct a new 
philosophical system.  
Although fascist ideology in Italy was firmly grounded in reality, at least according to its 
proponents, it still gave expression to an ideal that would help the Italian fascists achieve their 
ultimate goal of transcending reality, which is to say transforming Italy from its current state of 
relative mediocrity into a great world empire modeled on ancient Rome. Giovanni Gentile, the 
premier philosopher of the Italian fascist regime and minister of public instruction, wrote in 1936, 
“Our present ideal is to create a culture that produces men aware of this great tragedy of life: life 
as the struggle to make one’s way not selfishly or for oneself but for everyone. For everyone, 
because the life of Italy also informs the life of Europe and the rest of the world.”17 Gentile was 
speaking specifically of the fascist culture that would ultimately triumph over the decadence that 
threatened to engulf civilization.  
 The Italian fascists praised traditional, conservative values. Fascism promised restoration, 
not only of public order but also “those traditional social units that are sacred and inviolable… 
first and foremost among them, religion and the family.”18 The interwar culture that thrived in 
cities such as Paris and Berlin presaged the death and destruction of family values and traditional 
gender roles. Julius Evola argued that Western civilization “had carried out the most complete 
perversion of the rational order of things.”19 Modernity, for the Italian fascists, became 
synonymous with decadence – an inescapable decline and degradation of Western civilization. 
Fascism presented itself as the heroic savior of civilization. The fascist regime in Italy 
espoused a reactionary ideology aimed at remolding behaviors to combat cultural decadence and 
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spiritual degeneration. The fascist state, in order to save both Italy and the world from impending 
catastrophe, would intervene to cure “deviant and decadent impulses.”20 Words such as aggression, 
virility, bravery, discipline, will, and power appear over and over again. These are the 
characteristics and attributes of the ideal fascist man and, by extension, the fascist state. These 
qualities had to be nurtured and developed, praised and honored as the epitome of greatness. The 
repetition of the language is astonishing, as is the use of antithetical sentiments such as peace and 
ease, representing the decadent forces of modernity. A certain pragmatism resulted in this hyper-
masculine use of language. If fascism “conceives of life as a struggle,”21 then strength and power 
were necessary to overcome hardships and emerge victoriously. For Mussolini, there was no place 
in fascist thought and action for compassion or empathy. In a speech in Rome in 1942, Il Duce 
proclaimed, “War cannot be waged without hating the enemy from morning to night, in all the 
hours of the day and night, without spreading hatred and without making it an intrinsic part of 
one’s self. We must rid ourselves once and for all of false sentimentality.”22  
In “Foundations and Doctrine of Fascism,” Mussolini wrote, “Life for the fascist is a 
continuous, ceaseless battle that we eagerly embrace with great courage and with the requisite 
sense of intrepidness.”23 Life and war were inseparable, and potent warriors were imperative if the 
Italian fascists wished to obliterate their adversaries and establish their empire. As they surveyed 
the scene in Italy and across Europe, they saw the instability of a rapidly changing society and the 
outright rejection of traditional principles, a pervasive decadence that undermined conservative 
values. And in looking at the political climate, they were horrified to see a movement to the Left 
that had the potential to transform the world order and establish what they considered to be a 
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profoundly “unnatural” rule of impotent idealists. Mario Puccini, a renowned novelist and critic, 
wrote in 1926, “Other peoples have, at least for the most part, lost that sense of virile stability and 
that contact with reality from which, and solely from which, a lasting and deep art may be born.”24  
Born of war and revolution, like a deadly tsunami, a menacing red wave descended on 
Europe, crashing down on Hungary, Poland, Germany, and Italy. The fascist party was created to 
rid Italy of an ineffective Liberal democracy and the spreading socialist contagion that was 
becoming increasingly stronger and more virulent. The fascists would not be as indifferent as the 
Italian state that stood by and watched events unfold, refusing to act as the fascists and socialists 
engaged in bloody conflict, and neither would the throngs of Italian citizens who supported the 
fascist cause. The middle-class feared losing their property and privileges. Land owners feared 
giving up their land. The Catholic Church feared the abolishment of religion. Big business feared 
an end to an economic system that allowed them to flourish. And military leadership, along with 
a majority of World War I veterans, feared the downfall and collapse of Italy. As historian Martin 
Kitchen states, “The respectable classes therefore looked for protection against the red peril.”25 
The fascists thrived in this atmosphere of fear and panic.  
The fascist “Black Shirts” attacked socialists on city streets and in country villages. They 
became progressively more ferocious, intensifying their brutality, destroying trade union offices, 
harassing, beating, and murdering anyone who supported the socialist agenda. What resulted was 
essentially civil war, as fascists and socialists clashed throughout Italy. People around the world, 
fearful of the red menace, celebrated the fascists for their courage and bravery. The Times 
newspaper in London wrote, “Fascismo has proved itself virile, well-disciplined, fearless, and 
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ready for emergencies.”26 The socialists, although passionate and determined, ultimately lacked 
the leadership to bring the revolution to Italy. Without a Lenin to guide them, they were crushed 
by the fascist onslaught.  
In the dangerous and unstable world of interwar Europe, the Italian fascists resolved to 
manifest “strong, hard, active, solar, Mediterranean beings; beings made up of force and 
eventually only of force.”27 Mussolini promised Italy both a renewal of ancient Roman power and 
a glorious Italian future. Giovanni Gentile wrote, “Sooner or later all peoples who aren’t resigned 
to perishing must wage war.”28 The Italians did not wish to perish. As a nation, the fascists argued, 
they had to make a choice between impotence and power, between weakness and virility. What 
was needed was “a will to action, a will to greatness, and a will to power on the part of the Italian 
nation and civilization.”29 Mussolini became the physical manifestation of this will, the heroic 
conqueror and lion tamer who would lead Italy to its glorious future.  
Fascism in Italy arose out of this conflict between modernity and tradition. Only strength 
and power could destroy the forces that threatened to consume civilization. Only a courageous 
man of action could overcome the perils of decadence and decay and drive History forward. 
Fascism was a product of its time, arising “in a period of tumultuous fervor and of political 
passion.”30 It was a dangerous time, as a new-style politics emerged based on mass participation 
and systematic political violence. Although the Italian fascists ultimately failed, their ideology was 
born of necessity as a practical solution to the chaos, trauma, and anxiety that plagued interwar 
Europe.  
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Mussolini’s goal was to recreate modern Italy in the image of ancient Rome. The ideology 
he and his followers professed was profoundly aggressive and militaristic. To create the ideal, to 
realize their glorious future, all enemies were to be destroyed without mercy or pity. In the 
aftermath of the Great War, there was a desperate need to create a new type of future. Mussolini 
offered his vision of what that type of future should be, and the Italian fascists employed practices 
that they believed would destroy the “red menace” of communism and bring the vision to fruition.  
 
Germany31 
Nazi ideology was fundamentally driven by racism and expansionism. This was the 
foundation, and from this foundation emerged the political and nationalistic worldview that 
resulted in World War II. The goal of Nazism was the creation of a racial utopia, a purified Volk 
ruled and controlled by the Aryan elites.32 In order to achieve this utopia, the Nazis needed to 
expand their territory eastward beyond the borders of Germany and eliminate or enslave the 
inferior races that dwelled there. In its essence, Nazi ideology was based on this twofold goal of 
racial purity and Lebensraum (Hitler’s concept of living space in Eastern Europe for the Germans). 
 The Nazi regime wanted to acquire the rich and fertile lands of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union,33 a large geographical region that included Poland, the Baltic States, Soviet Belarus, 
Soviet Ukraine, and portions of western Soviet Russia.34 The acquisition of this living space was 
essential for the Nazis, and they were willing to wage war and murder millions of people in order 
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acquire it and manifest their ideal of Lebensraum. This desire in part followed from the German 
defeat in World War I and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles in which Germany lost 
large amounts of land to France and Poland. Lebensraum in many ways represented the desire to 
regain their losses and overcome their humiliation. But it is important to remember that it was not 
only about making up for past losses – Hitler had a vision for a glorious German future, and this 
utopia could only be realized through expansionism. 
 Germany wanted “to conquer, exploit and colonize the European part of the Soviet 
Union.”35 Polish historian Czeslaw Pilichowski has argued that the Nazis wanted to “gradually 
denationalize and destroy the Slavic peoples, who were described as ‘inferior’ and ‘subhumans’ 
in Nazi racial ideology.”36 Here we see the connection between the Nazi desire for geographical 
expansion and Nazi racial beliefs. The two cannot be separated. They work together to create a 
unified Nazi ideology. This becomes evident when comparing the relatively peaceful occupations 
in Western Europe with the violent occupations in the East. The difference was that in the East 
there were both millions of Jews and Slavs and an abundance of fertile agricultural lands. The 
Nazis wanted these lands and they wanted to either destroy or enslave the peoples living there. 
Eastern Europe is where Nazi conceptions of racial hygiene and Lebensraum converged with 
devastating consequences. 
 The Nazis appropriated conceptions of racial purity to serve and justify their vision of an 
Aryan utopia. According to proponents of eugenics, “the well-being and vitality of a nation 
depended on the genetic fitness of its members.”37 Taken to its most illogical conclusions, eugenics 
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argued that the Aryan race held supremacy over inferior races such as the Jews and the Slavs. For 
Nazi supporters, Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection was applied to mankind. 
Human beings were not equal, and any notion of egalitarian ethics was absurd. The weak sought 
to overcome the strong, to reproduce with the powerful and superior in an effort to ensure the 
survival of their offspring. In time, Nazi supporters and sympathizers argued, the blood of the 
Aryans would be mixed with the blood of non-Aryans, ending Aryan supremacy and creating a 
degenerate race of inferiors. The Aryans had to destroy the inferior races if they were to survive, 
if culture and civilization was to survive. Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies had to be eliminated because 
of their “alien blood.”  
Historian Marion A. Kaplan has written that Nazi “biological politics promised a racial 
cleansing and reorganization of Germany and Europe that would be implemented through large-
scale eugenic schemes.”38 The lands of the East that the Nazis wished to conquer contained 
Europe’s largest population of Jews and Slavs.39 These inferior beings would have to be destroyed 
if the Nazis were to fulfill their destiny. For the Nazi regime, eugenics allowed them to clearly 
formulate their ultimate purpose: “Creating a unified racial community in which alien and inferior 
elements were eliminated and individuals renounced other ties and loyalties and were prepared to 
sacrifice themselves for the community would produce an irresistible instrument of expansion and 
conquest.”40 
 Hitler’s Mein Kampf, despite its rambling and often incoherent prose, provides crucial 
insight into a belief system that served as a starting point for Nazi ideology. Hitler identifies 
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socialism as a menace that had the potential to destroy humanity, arguing that the Jewish doctrine 
of Marxism rejected the aristocratic principles of Nature and the eternal privilege of power and 
strength. The socialist menace was an abomination of God’s will, and Hitler believed it was his 
destiny to save humanity and civilization from this destructive force.41 
 Hitler’s thoughts on Marxism are clearly expressed in passages where he argues that 
socialism was a pernicious threat to civilization, a perilous “world plague.”42 Marxism, according 
to Hitler, “fans the need for social justice, somehow slumbering in every Aryan man, into hatred 
against those who have been better favored by fortune.”43 Contrary to Nazi conceptions of 
individual power and nobility, Marxism sought “to exclude the pre-eminence of personality in all 
fields of human life and replace it by the numbers of the mass.”44 The two ideological systems, 
Marxism and Nazism, were completely incompatible and irreconcilable. Socialism, in the hands 
of the Bolsheviks, was the “international serpent.”45 It was the task of the Nazis to crush this 
serpent and save not only Germany, but all of humanity.  
 Throughout Mein Kampf, Hitler is unequivocal on his understanding of the Soviet Union, 
calling the rulers of present-day Russia “common blood-stained criminals” and “the scum of 
humanity,” who “slaughtered and wiped out thousands of her leading intellectuals in wild blood 
lust, and now for almost ten years have been carrying on the most cruel and tyrannical régime of 
all time.”46 Hitler truly believed it was his mission to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its 
ultimate mission: “to impose its bloody oppression on the whole world.”47 And if there was any 
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doubt regarding Hitler’s intentions, he was clear and distinct on the nature of Nazi imperialism: 
“We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land 
of the east… If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and 
her vassal border states.”48 
 What began as a policy of exclusion turned into a policy of annihilation – repression led to 
genocide.49 The Nazis believed the supreme Aryan race had to defend itself from the non-Aryan 
threat. This was a race war based on the tenets of eugenics and social Darwinism. The powerful 
Aryan race was destined to destroy the inferior non-Aryans. Once this was accomplished, an Aryan 
utopia could be created. To ensure the continued existence of this glorious utopia, the sick, the 
weak, and the asocial had to be eliminated as well. It became absolutely necessary to prevent them 
from passing on their “defective” genes.  
In the Aryan utopia, a world of strength, honor, and purity, decadence and decay would 
cease to exist. Culture would flourish and civilization would thrive. This was the ideal, and Hitler 
and his followers believed it was not only possible but absolutely necessary. If they failed, the 
inferior races would overcome the Aryans and civilization would be destroyed.  
Some scholars have pointed out that the Nazis seemed to waver in their dealings with the 
Slavic populations of Eastern Europe, that they were willing to work with Slavs and that they only 
turned to policies of murder when the Slavic populations showed signs of active resistance.50 But 
these instances of apparent concessions are only further examples of the Nazi regime’s willingness 
to do whatever was necessary to achieve their goals. They would do what they had to do in the 
moment, never losing sight of their ideal. These Slavs had no future in the Aryan utopia. They 
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would be murdered or enslaved, but never treated as equals. The Aryans and the Slavs could never 
coexist. As Hitler argued in Mein Kampf, the Slavs were an “inferior race.”51 Nazi ideology 
demanded progression; they would never allow for the possibility of regression. 
 
A Global Phenomenon 
In response to the red wave of socialism that descended on Europe following World War 
I, virulent black waves of fascism arose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
Austria, and even Japan. Supported by the industrialists, land owners, and middle-classes, fascism 
in its various guises quickly grew momentum and popular support. From Western Europe to 
Eastern Europe, and into the Far East, the fascist ideology vehemently opposed the Soviet project 
and precluded, at least for the time being, the possibility of a global socialist revolution. 
Historians have traditionally disregarded the political violence of interwar France, treating 
it as a marginal phenomenon, but as new evidence continues to emerge, contemporary scholars are 
now beginning to believe that such violence was an essential feature of all European states in the 
interwar period, including France.52 By the mid-1920s, fascist-minded individuals founded several 
extreme right-wing paramilitary groups, known as “leagues.” In the 1930s, several hundred 
thousand men and women joined these groups. In response, the Left founded the anti-fascist 
Popular Front. Brawls were a common occurrence, as people on both sides of the political spectrum 
attacked one another with stones, bricks, cobbles, clubs, iron bars, and even stink bombs. The 
police in turn used violence to maintain public order. During a protest in Paris in 1934, the police 
killed thirteen rioters and injured hundreds more.53   
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Romania envisioned their great future by looking to their mythical past. This idealized 
Romania, the Volksgemeinschaft, was based on a belief in the sanctity of the nation and the 
glorification of the Dacian Empire.54 The Romanian national mission of rejuvenation followed 
from a faith in eugenics, racial anthropology, and serology. For the Romanian intelligentsia, who 
viewed the nation as a living organism, improving the racial qualities of the nation soon became 
“a totalizing nationalist ideology.”55   
In 1926, the social hygienist and eugenicist Iuliu Moldovan published Biopolitica. He was 
the first of many in Romania to link biopolitics with national politics. The ideas expressed by 
Moldovan and others like him around the world were officially endorsed by political regimes 
throughout Europe in the interwar period.56 The adoption of principles such as ethnic reengineering 
and social segregation intimately linked with notions of a national rebirth leading to an ideal future. 
A Romanian biopolitical utopia, free of Jews, gypsies, and the dysgenic, was based on the 
“palingenetic myth” of rebirth. The Romanians sought a spiritual metamorphosis and a new 
“ethnic ontology.”57  
In Japan, liberal intellectuals railed against the proliferation of violence during the interwar 
years. They argued that violence was an eroding force with the power to destroy civilization. 
Violence represented the backward and uncivilized, the primitive and unevolved. It was disorder, 
the antithesis of reason. They implored the state, as representatives of order, to intervene and stop 
the violence.58  
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Despite the pleas from forward -looking liberals, radical groups emerged that were linked 
together by their reactionary ideology. They proclaimed reverence for the emperor and supported 
aggressive imperialism. On city streets, they attacked socialists and anarchists. They also attacked 
striking laborers. As a way to eliminate their enemies, assassinations were not uncommon. Fearful 
of the Bolsheviks’ rise to power following the Russian Revolution, and what that could potentially 
mean for Japan, they devoted themselves to protecting traditional Japanese values and ways of life 
by embracing “the way of the warrior.”59 Violence was encouraged, and it was justified as a means 
of protecting their homeland and demonstrating loyalty to the imperial house. The world around 
them was changing rapidly. They too wanted to create a utopian future, in the image of their 
magnificent past, and their ideology drove them to overcome their liberal enemies and aid Japan 
as it embarked on a path of imperial domination.   
 
The Soviet Union 
The Party also had formidable domestic circumstances to contend with. For Homo 
Sovieticus, a new species of man that emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, living conditions 
were unimaginable.60 In urban areas, there was a severe housing crisis, as ten million peasants 
abandoned the countryside and sought work in the cities. The people were crowded into communal 
apartments, dormitories, and barracks. With massive shortages of primary goods, it was nearly 
impossible to obtain necessities such as bread, milk, and butter. Staples like salt, soap, and 
kerosene became luxuries. Hats and shoes were often indulgences. Urban services were non-
existent, resulting in a monstrous filth and repugnance. As an American working in the Soviet 
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Union at this time said, “Stench, filth, dilapidation batter the sense at every turn.”61 The darkened 
streets were overrun with gangs of homeless children and drunken workers, and “Robberies, 
murders, drunken fights, and random attacks on passerby were common.”62 
In industrial settlements like Magnitogorsk, along with the appalling working and living 
conditions, there was sickness and disease. The “classrooms” where workers sought socialist 
enlightenment were usually decrepit barracks without heat or running water.63 Most workers toiled 
for twelve hours each day on empty stomachs in the freezing cold. They lacked proper boots and 
gloves, and because supplies such as lumber and light bulbs were unavailable, workers had to 
navigate dizzying heights without scaffoldings and work in the dark.64 Workers suffered horrific 
injuries and were forced to endure excruciating pain before finally dying in the cold and dirty 
hospitals where the nurses, “had become completely indifferent to the pain and suffering they saw 
around them.”65 
But with capitalism in crisis as a result of the Great Depression, and with fascism and 
Nazism on the ascendant, Homo Sovieticus maintained faith in the promise of a utopian future. 
“We’ll all have automobiles,” said one worker in Magnitogorsk. “Just wait five or ten years and 
we won’t need one single thing from the capitalist world,” said another.66 Although not everyone 
understood the ideological nuances of Hegelian dialectics, they were building socialism, the very 
antithesis of capitalism, a new type of civilization and the embodiment of the Enlightenment 
dream.67 In the present they would suffer, but in time, with hard work and patience, the Soviet 
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Union would achieve a superior form of modernity and high international status while the people 
would enjoy social welfare, full employment, child care, health care, retirement pensions, free 
education, and the promise of advancement in the workforce.68 
In the 1930s, Stalinism was much more than a political ideology – it was an experiment in 
popular participation and a new way of organizing society. It was a forward-looking and 
progressive civilization, “a set of values, a social identity, a way of life.”69 Settlements like 
Magnitogorsk were much more than worksites for men and blast furnaces; they were physical 
manifestations of a “grand historical endeavor”70 that transcended the drive for rapid 
industrialization and encompassed everything from housing and education to styles of dress, 
modes of reasoning, and uses of language. Magnitogorsk was a unique and distinctive example of 
Stalinism, not as a totalitarian nightmare but as a rationally organized and socially transformative 
civilization.  
It was a work in progress, and Stalin, as leader of the Soviet Union, was tasked with 
protecting and safeguarding the great socialist experiment. The situation was precarious. 
Opposition within the Party argued for abandoning Stalinism and taking a different path.71 The 
people still had their faith, but with such dire living conditions and the onset of ambivalence, 
confusion, and disappointment, it would only take a spark to ignite reactionary rebellion and engulf 
the revolution.72 The kulaks were returning to their farms, criminals were wreaking havoc in the 
cities, and the men who heroically defeated their foes in the Revolution and Civil War were 
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within the Party opposed many of Stalin’s ideas and policies. See chapter four. 
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growing tired and weary.73 The ideal of a united proletarian identity was still only a dream, as the 
non-Russian nationalities throughout the Soviet Union desperately clung to their ethnic and 
historical roots.74 Hundreds of thousands of Party members were nothing more than uneducated 
opportunists, incapable of enlightenment and unqualified to help move the Soviet Union into its 
next stage of development.75 And these were only the domestic circumstances Stalin had to deal 
with. Beyond the Soviet borders, from East to West, Stalin was facing capitalist encirclement and 
fascist expansionism.76 War was coming. To survive the onslaught and lead the Soviet Union into 
its radiant future, Stalin took action. By the time of the Great Terror in 1936, Soviet officials had 
expelled nearly one million people from the Party, the secret police had arrested and convicted 
hundreds of thousands, and OGPU executioners had shot tens of thousands.77 But this was only 
the beginning. By the mid to late 1930s, the threat of a second great war compelled Stalin to expand 
his scope and intensify his methods. 
 
Conclusion   
In an essay focusing on the interwar period for The Oxford Handbook of European History, 
Paul Hagenloh argued that violence was “the natural mode of state administration at the time.”78 
Throughout the interwar period, violence begot more violence. As Hagenloh states, “The entire 
continent was so awash with violence in the early twentieth century – world war, civil wars, labour 
                                                          
73 Oleg V. Khlevniuk argues one of the major reasons for the Party purges was to rid the state of men who no 
longer had the will and ambition to lead the Soviet Union. See Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle 
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74 I discuss this in more depth in the section on the non-Russian nationalities in chapter 1. 
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camps, and mass repressions.”79 Hagenloh identifies three central features of the interwar period: 
constructive projects designed to mold society into the ideological ideal, excision of those deemed 
unworthy from the body politic, and popular political participation. These three features were 
common throughout Europe and around the world, and all three features, which often overlapped 
in practice, involved the application of violence to various degrees. In Romania, for example, 
ordinary citizens participated in the political process by joining fascist groups and organizations. 
Some even joined fascist death squads that assassinated political enemies, eliminating those 
deemed unworthy of a place in their utopian future. And some of these ordinary citizens were also 
members of the intelligentsia that designed biopolitical projects with the aim of realizing the 
national mission, manifesting the ideal of a Greater Romania peopled by a race of strong and noble 
Romanians. The same pattern emerges in modern states around the world.   
In nations as diverse as France, Italy, Germany, Romania, Japan, and the Soviet Union, 
despite political and ideological differences, state policies and practices were remarkably similar. 
All were seeking to create a new world order out of the mass destruction and devastation of World 
War I, and all were driven by a belief that they were tasked with saving civilization from extinction. 
This was the age of ideology – ideology not as an exercise in philosophical musing, but as a matter 
of life and death. Political violence, various forms of social engineering, and murder of one’s 
enemies were all employed throughout the interwar period. What separated states like the Soviet 
Union, Germany, and Italy was not the policies and practices employed, but rather the extension 
and expansion of those policies and practices. Seen from this perspective, Stalin’s Great Terror, 
rather than being singled out as a malevolent aberration, is placed on a continuum of modern 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
66 
 
 
 
statecraft that defined the interwar world. When faced with potentially catastrophic foreign and 
domestic circumstances, Stalin was compelled to take decisive action. 
All of this leads to an important question: Why did these particular circumstances compel 
Stalin to initiate his blood purges? The answer takes us back to the “fifth column” theory. With 
growing opposition and discontent within the Soviet Union and fascism on the ascendant without, 
the Party was vulnerable, susceptible to attack. Speaking of the situation several decades after the 
fact, one of Stalin’s closest advisors, Vyacheslav Molotov said, “Nineteen thirty-seven was 
necessary. If you consider that after the revolution we were slashing left and right, and we were 
victorious, but enemies of different sorts remained, and in the face of impending fascist aggression 
they might unite… they would falter and switch sides… you couldn’t count on them at a time of 
crisis.”80 Another member of Stalin’s inner circle, Lazar Kagonovich, said that the mass 
repressions were “a struggle against a ‘fifth column’ that came to power in Germany under 
Hitlerite fascism and was preparing war against the land of Soviets.”81 
Wendy Goldman has argued that “The Soviet Union in the late 1930s was a society 
threatened by external enemies. Fascism was ascendant in Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and 
Spain, and Hitler’s armies were moving east.”82 The belief within the Soviet Union was that fascist 
sympathizers had infiltrated the Party and nearly all Soviet institutions. Others, either sympathetic 
to fascist ideology or antagonistic to the Communist Party, were thought to be lying in wait for the 
opportunity to betray the Soviet Union. Collectively, these people made up the “fifth column.” 
With a second great war looming on the horizon, targeting them as enemies of the people was a 
preemptive strike.  
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The threat was much greater than the rise of European fascism. Tensions in the Far East 
reached new heights in the late 1930s after Japan invaded China. Stalin quickly signed a non-
aggression treaty with China, clearly aimed at Japan, and began exiling the Korean population 
from Far eastern territories, with the goal of “stopping the infiltration of Japanese espionage.”83 
Spies and potential spies were infiltrating the Soviet Union from both east and west. And Stalin, 
who had experienced the apocalyptic destruction of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the 
Russian Civil War, along with the horrifying famines and epidemics brought on by prolonged war 
and conflict, was determined to prevent such devastation from consuming the Soviet Union and 
eradicating the revolution.
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CHAPTER 4 “THE GREAT TERROR” 
Who’s going to remember all this riffraff in ten or twenty years time? No one. Who remembers 
now the names of the boyars Ivan the Terrible got rid of? No one.1 
 
“Wreckers, diversionists, spies, and killers”2    
 On the afternoon of August 23rd, 1936, in the October Hall of the House of Unions, all eyes 
were on comrade V.V. Ulrich, President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the 
USSR. Before him stood sixteen defendants, accused of conspiring with fascist and capitalist 
powers to assassinate Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union’s supreme leader. The prosecution had 
argued that these men had not only plotted to murder Stalin and other Party leaders, but also to 
spurn the revolution and restore capitalism in Russia.   
In a world so often veiled in secrecy, this trial was highly publicized, covered by media 
outlets across the globe. One of the reasons for the fascination was that some of the accused were 
high-ranking Party members. Grigory Zinoviev was one of the founding fathers of the Soviet 
Union, a member of the first Politburo, and head of the Communist International. He had also been 
a close personal friend of Vladimir Lenin. Lev Kamenev, another member of the first Politburo, 
like Zinoviev, had worked closely with Lenin during the Russian Revolution and Civil War, 
helping to establish the Bolsheviks as undisputed masters of the new Russian state. Both men, per 
the prosecution, were involved in a “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center.”3  
                                                          
1 Attributed to Stalin, in Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 5. 
2 From a speech Stalin gave at the March Plenum of 1937. 
3 “Report on Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center,” Marxists Internet Archive, 
1936. <www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017). 
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 White Corinthian columns and light-blue walls adorned the October Hall. Scattered 
throughout, along with the thirty foreign journalists and diplomats who had been there for the past 
week covering this extraordinary story, sat 150 Soviet citizens, most of whom were actually 
NKVD clerks and officials. NKVD officers, armed with rifles and bayonets, escorted the prisoners 
to the dock, as Ulrich, a fat, slovenly man with a shaven head, prepared himself to read the verdict.4 
Just past 2:30 PM, he stood to pronounce the sentence; above him, hanging from the rafters, as if 
to evoke moral authority over the proceedings, swayed colossal banners with the portraits of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. All sixteen defendants were found guilty. They had “perpetrated the 
foul murder of Comrade S.M. Kirov” and organized terrorist groups with the goal of assassinating 
Stalin. Kirov’s murder was central to the case. As the Party leader in Leningrad, Kirov was a 
powerful and influential man. His assassination was such a shock that Stalin himself became 
personally involved in the investigation.5 
As Ulrich continued, it became clear that the “evidence” proved both Zinoviev and 
Kamenev were following instructions from Leon Trotsky, Stalin’s bitter rival following the death 
of Lenin, whose ultimate goal was to destroy the Soviet Union. All sixteen men were sentenced 
“the supreme penalty – to be shot, and all property belonging to them to be confiscated.”6 When 
Ulrich finished reading the verdict, prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky delivered the trial’s concluding 
speech. “Before us are criminals,” bellowed Vyshinsky with rage and indignation, “dangerous, 
hardened, cruel and ruthless towards our people and towards our ideals, towards the leaders of our 
                                                          
4 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 91-93. 
5 Many historians have emphasized Kirov’s assassination in their analyses of the Great Terror, suggesting the event 
triggered the blood purges that followed. Many have also argued that Stalin used the assassination as an excuse to 
purge his political enemies. It is worth noting that the first Moscow show trial took place 19 months after the Kirov 
assassination. 
6“Report on Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center.”  
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struggle, the leaders of the land of Soviets, the leaders of the toilers of the world!” He finished the 
speech with an impassioned plea for justice: “I demand that dogs gone mad should be shot!”7 
Within days, officers of Stalin’s secret police executed all sixteen men. These officers, 
members of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, abbreviated NKVD, would have a 
central role to play in the events that would soon immerse the Soviet Union in over two years of 
unfathomable terror and repression. Following the executions, Nikolai Ezhov, an NKVD official 
who helped organize the trial, took each spent bullet, wrapped it in paper, and labeled it with every 
victim’s name.8  
Zinoviev and Kamenev were the first victims. Why would they betray the Party and their 
own people? These men were once devoted to the Revolution; men who sacrificed so much over 
the years in the service of the Bolshevik cause. Why would they take part in such a hideous plot? 
What the foreign journalists and diplomats did not see were the days and nights leading up to their 
signed confessions. In dark, musty cells, as August’s sweltering summer heat intensified, agents 
subjected Zinoviev, who was ill at the time, to all-night interrogations. Already deprived of sleep 
and suffering from his illness, NKVD chief Genrikh Yagoda turned the heat on in Zinoviev’s cell. 
Yagoda and his agents then focused their attention on Kamenev, threatening to murder his son. 
Finally, when the two could no longer endure any more abuse, they agreed to confess, with the 
guarantee that their lives, the lives of their family members, and the lives of their supporters would 
be spared.9 More than this, even under such remarkable circumstances, a curious belief helped men 
like Zinoviev and Kamenev make their fateful decision to confess: “The Party is always right.”10 
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8 Getty and Naumov, 2. 
9 Conquest, 87. 
10 Leon Trotsky, quoted in Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia 
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Of course the guarantee meant nothing. Shortly after his own execution, Kamenev’s 16-year-old 
son, not a defendant at the trial but accused of collaborating with the enemy, was shot in the head 
by NKVD officers.11    
 By the end of 1938, NKVD agents would execute nearly 700,000 men, women, and 
children.12 An estimated 300,000 more died in the Gulag camps. Were they all guilty of plotting 
to murder Stalin and restore capitalism in Russia by working with the fascist powers of Europe? 
Was Stalin a paranoid madman, finding conspiracies behind every corner, plots that threatened to 
pollute and corrupt the hearts and minds of loyal Soviet citizens? Who were the victims? The 
“Trial of the Sixteen” was only the first of three spectacular trials that captivated audiences around 
the world. Through these trials, Stalin laid the groundwork that allowed him to purge tens of 
thousands of Party members, government officials, industrial managers, and Red Army generals, 
admirals, commissars, and officers. This was the first wave of the Great Terror, the blood purge of 
the “old guard.”  
 
The Old Guard and the Hunt for Enemies of the People 
Stalin was not pleased with the way the media covered the first trial. He complained to 
comrades Lazar Kagonovich and Vyacheslav Molotov, “Pravda failed to produce a single article 
that provided a Marxist explanation of the process of degradation of these scum.” It was not, Stalin 
went on, about a struggle for political power, but “a struggle against the Soviets, a struggle against 
collectivization, against industrialization, a struggle, consequently, to restore capitalism in the 
towns and villages of the USSR.” Pravda should have said, “Whoever fights against the Party and 
                                                          
11 Getty and Naumov, 7. 
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the government in the USSR stands for the defeat of socialism and the restoration of capitalism.” 
Anyone who opposed the Party, Stalin believed, was a counterrevolutionary enemy of the state. 
After all, Stalin continued, “Lenin said that if a faction or factions persist in their errors in their 
struggle against the Party, under the Soviet system, they will, without fail, slide down to the level 
of White Guardism, the defense of capitalism, a struggle against the Soviets, and must without fail, 
merge with the enemies of Soviet rule.”13 Stalin reached his conclusions on the role of opponents 
based on Lenin’s condemnation of factions at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921.14 The formula 
was clear and distinct – those who opposed the Party opposed the Soviet Union.15  
The sixteen executed following the first Moscow show trial represented the “Leftist-
Opposition,” those who believed Stalin was too conservative and wanted the Soviet Union to take 
more radical action on the world stage in its efforts to advance the cause of socialism.16 By late 
September 1936, Nikolai Ezhov was the new NKVD chief. Stalin believed Yagoda was incapable 
of rooting out the Soviet Union’s hidden enemies. Ezhov, a former factory worker, known by his 
friends as “Nicky the bookworm,” organized a second trial.17 Working closely with Stalin, who 
was undoubtedly the mastermind of the show trials and who controlled Ezhov’s every move, the 
NKVD chief targeted new enemies and uncovered new plots that threatened the security of the 
Soviet Union.18 Only a few months later, in January 1937, the second show trial began. This time 
the accused represented the Communist managerial elite.19 Now seventeen new defendants faced 
                                                          
13 “Stalin to Kagonovich and Molotov,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1936. <www.marxists.org> (July 8, 2017). 
14 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 
167. 
15 Richard Pipes writes that Lenin feared allowing the opposition a voice would “dilute the movement’s 
revolutionary zeal as well as rob the party of its greatest asset, which was disciplined unity.” Richard Pipes, Three 
“Whys” of the Russian Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 78. 
16 Getty and Naumov, 4. 
17 Getty and Naumov, 1. 
18 Nicolas Werth, “A State Against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union,” in The Black 
Book of Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 190. 
19 Fitzpatrick, 195. 
73 
 
 
 
Ulrich and Vyshinsky. Like the first trial, as NKVD clerks and officials filled the seats, journalists 
and diplomats from all over the world watched as the cameras rolled. 
All seventeen confessed. Former leftist leaders Geogry Piatkov and Karl Radek were 
highly respected and distinguished Party members, but Ezhov, reveling in his role as savior of the 
people, declared, “These swine must be strangled!”20 NKVD officers proceeded to shoot thirteen 
of the defendants. Four others, including Radek, died in the Gulag. According to newspaper 
reports, the Russian people, like much of the Western world, watched the trial unfold in dismay. 
The language was loaded – spies, wreckers, saboteurs, masked enemies. . . . Authorities urged 
Soviet citizens to be aware of enemies posing as socialists, pretending to be loyal Soviet citizens 
when in fact what they really wanted was to destroy the Party and restore capitalism in Russia.  
They were urged to participate in the hunt for masked enemies of the people. In urban centers like 
Moscow and Leningrad, fear and paranoia enveloped the factories, the universities, and even the 
communal apartments.21 No one was safe. No one could be trusted. The friendly neighbor, the 
hard-working employee, the smiling young man at the newsstand – they could all be spies, in the 
service of fascist monsters, plotting to destroy the Soviet Union and murder its leaders.  
Not even the Red Army, protectors of the toilers of the earth and guardians of the people, 
could escape the crimson madness.22 By the time the Terror had concluded in 1938, Stalin arrested 
or purged up to 35,000 men from the Red Army.23 Many were high-ranking generals and admirals, 
including Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky, Deputy Commissar of Defense. NKVD agents arrested 
Tukhachevsky, along with seven other senior officers of the Red Army, in June 1937. Charged 
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with treason as spies for Germany and Japan, the officers endured several days of brutal 
interrogations before finally confessing. All eight were shot.24  
Ezhov purged the NKVD as well, arresting over 2000 former lieutenants and NKVD 
leaders. Accused of spying for Germany and plotting to overthrow the Soviet Union from within, 
most were shot.25 The majority of those purged from the NKVD were Yagoda’s men, who quickly 
fell under suspicion when Yagoda himself was arrested in March 1937. Stalin was meticulous, 
targeting every institution that had any impact on life in the USSR. The NKVD, the Red Army, 
the Party, industrial management – all were purged in a colossal coup d’état carried out by Stalin 
and his leadership group.26 The purpose was to remove all opposition and renovate the Party.27 
Stalin had a plan, and the spectacle of show trials and Red Army purges was only his first step. 
The third and final show trial took place in March 1938. This was the “Trial of 21,” the 
“Rightist-Opposition” who considered Stalin too radical. Again, many Party elites found 
themselves fighting for their lives. The celebrated Nikolai Bukharin, along with Aleksei Rykov, 
Mikhail Tomsky, and former NKVD chief Genrikh Yagoda were all accused of being 
“Trotskyites” and planning to murder Stalin and destroy the Soviet Union. NKVD officers 
threatened to murder Bukharin’s wife and infant son.28 Hoping to save his family, he finally 
confessed on March 12th. Bukharin admitted everything – the struggle against the Party and the 
Soviet government, the counterrevolutionary plots to betray his country, the organizing of kulak 
uprisings. In his own words, he was “responsible for a grave and monstrous crime against the 
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socialist fatherland and the whole international proletariat.”29 He was quickly executed, along with 
Rykov, Tomsky, and Yagoda.30 
The NKVD’s chief executioner was Vasily Blokhin, who personally shot most of the high-
profile defendants. Men like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tukhachevsky, Bukharin, and Yagoda were 
most likely killed by Blokhin. He also murdered thousands of workers and peasants by the time 
his bloody and fiendish career came to an end. During the Great Terror, Blokhin commanded an 
execution squad in Moscow. A few years later, in 1940, at the site of the notorious Katyn massacre, 
Blokhin was stationed in Kalinin. Every night Blokhin shot approximately 250 men, one after 
another, draped in his gore splattered leather cap, apron, and long gloves.31  
On the streets of urban centers like Leningrad and Moscow, the Terror engulfed tens of 
thousands of ordinary citizens. The newspapers fueled the flames. Every day stories about 
unmasking enemies and spies filled the papers.32 They quoted defendants from the show trials, the 
“wreckers” on trial for plotting to destroy the Soviet Union from within, who warned that “soon 
our workers will perish in the mines like rats.”33 Soviet citizens devoted themselves to hunting for 
internal, masked adversaries. In the factories, workshops were held  to educate workers on ways 
to recognize the masked enemies.34 Local papers proclaimed, “The task of every honest Soviet 
citizen is to know how to unmask enemies in any mask, to discern and to prevent their insidious, 
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traitorous activities.”35 The hunt for enemies, which was sparked by Party directives and mass 
campaigns, soon resulted in a wave of denunciations, as workers denounced factory managers, 
students denounced professors, and Communists denounced fellow Communists.36 Millions of 
ordinary people, immersed in this climate of “spy mania,” actively participated in the hunt and 
helped sustain the political culture of mass fear and terror.37 American papers, struggling to 
understand the chaos and confusion that seemed to be consuming the Soviet Union, spoke of the 
“Salem witch-hunt of Bolshevism.”38  
Stalin’s speech at the March Plenum in 1937 initiated the manic hunt for spies and traitors. 
He talked about the “incontrovertible facts” that enemies of the people played active roles in 
undermining the Soviet Union’s economic and administrative institutions, that they had penetrated 
all levels of government, including the Party itself. He condemned leading comrades who failed 
to recognize the wreckers and spies, arguing that their failures to protect the fatherland resulted 
from carelessness, complacency, and naivety. These comrades had failed to “recognize the wolves 
in sheep’s clothing and were unable to tear away their masks.”39  
During the June Plenum of the Central Committee, Ezhov announced that he had 
discovered a grand conspiracy, the “center of centers.” The conspiracy, Ezhov argued, which 
united leftists, rightists, Trotskyists, members of former socialist parties, army officers, NKVD 
officers, and foreign communists, had infiltrated the Red Army, military intelligence, the 
Comintern, the commissariats of foreign affairs, transport, and agriculture.40 Spies were 
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everywhere, masked as loyal Communists, and their ultimate purpose was the destruction of the 
USSR.  
Although the theatrics of the show trials deceived many people around the world, not all 
Western journalists believed the tale of internal plots and conspiracies. Some condemned the 
“Dictator Joseph V. Stalin” who used Soviet firing squads to eliminate his enemies.41 Some spoke 
of Stalin’s “oriental despotism” and the “primitive” and “malleable” Soviet people that allowed 
themselves to be enslaved by such a cruel tyrant.42 Others looked to former Russian luminaries for 
insight. Leon Trotsky, who had fled to Mexico, took every opportunity to deny the charges against 
him and denounce Stalin, maintaining that Russia had “betrayed the faith of Marx and Lenin.”43 
Former leader of the Provisional Government Alexander Kerensky, who achieved cult-like status 
following the Russian Revolution,44 spoke of the “moral bankruptcy of Bolshevism.” He said the 
world needed to know that there were daily mass executions in Russia and that the charges were 
“frame-ups, lies and falsifications.” Stalin, through his “rule of fear and terror,” had already 
confined five million victims to prison and concentration camps.45 As the West learned of Ezhov’s 
purge of the NKVD, stories appeared that accused the Soviet Union of being not a socialist state, 
but a totalitarian regime guilty of criminal tyranny. In an environment where those responsible for 
obtaining confessions were now confessing themselves, no one’s honor, liberty, or life was safe.46 
The purge of the old guard and the hunt for enemies of the people completely enveloped 
the Soviet Union for nearly two years. It presented Stalin and the Party with an opportunity to 
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educate the people on the dangers and threats that had the potential to destroy the USSR.47 But this 
first wave of mass repression and terror served another, more diabolical purpose: to divert and 
distract both the citizens of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world from what was really going 
on. In fact, the veil was not lifted until Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” in 1956, when the 
newly appointed leader of the USSR condemned Stalin.48 And even then, the true extent of the 
blood purges remained a state secret. 
Nearly a year before the conclusion of the last Moscow show trial, Stalin and Ezhov 
initiated the “mass operations.”49 These operations were not covered in the papers. It took several 
decades until the Western world even learned of their existence.50 Even though the first wave of 
violence that washed over the Soviet Union led to the executions of 40,000 people, the Great Terror 
did not truly begin until the Politburo released its resolution “On Anti-Soviet Elements” on 2 July, 
1937.51 
 
00447 and the Kulak Operations  
Andrei Grigor’evich Nademskii was an Orthodox priest at the Vydubychi-Heorhii church 
in Kiev. On 20 December, 1937, NKVD agents arrested Nademskii and charged him with “anti-
Soviet agitation.” His interrogator claimed that the priest had called the Communists barbarians 
and referred to the NKVD as Satan. He had also told people that when the Soviet regime fell they 
would be severely punished for their transgressions. When asked to confess, Nademskii replied, 
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“I never conducted any anti-Soviet activity… I am an apolitical person and never discuss political 
subjects with any of my acquaintances.” Upon hearing Nademskii’s denial, the interrogator, who 
had been writing the confession in longhand, took out a clean sheet of paper and asked the priest, 
once again, to admit his guilt.  
NKVD agents soon extracted the desired confession, most likely under torture. Now 
Nademskii said, “Yes, I am forced to confess that being oppressed by the Soviet regime, I told 
some individual priests and clergy about my anti-Soviet sentiments.” Two witnesses confirmed 
Nademskii’s guilt. Whether or not they too were forced to provide statements or had personal 
grudges against the priest is unknown. Either way, the NKVD officer had what he needed. Less 
than three weeks later, the sixty-nine-year old Nademskii was shot in the head and thrown into a 
mass grave in Bykivnia.52 
Nademskii was only one of the hundreds of thousands of men and women targeted as a 
result of order 00447. On 30 July, 1937, Mikhail Frinovskii, Ezhov’s personal assistant, presented 
Stalin with the operational order titled “Regarding Operations of Repression of Former Kulaks, 
Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements.” The Politburo swiftly approved the order and 
authorized Ezhov to proceed by sending instructions to regional NKVD and Party administrators.53 
Those targeted as criminals could be horse and cattle thieves, robbers who had escaped Soviet 
penal institutions, or anyone who had dealings with the judicial system in the past.54 The anti-
Soviet elements could be church officials, former White officers, former Socialist Revolutionaries 
or Mensheviks who had opposed the Bolsheviks, former tsarist officials, political prisoners being 
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held in the Gulag, or anyone who the local NKVD had a file on, like Nademskii who had been 
arrested twice before in 1922 and 1930.55 
Ezhov directed local authorities to register criminal offenders and kulaks. He also directed 
them to establish local tribunals, “troikas,” comprised of regional bosses to decide who was to be 
sent to the Gulag and who was to be shot.56 The troikas usually consisted of the local NKVD chief, 
the local procurator, and the secretary of the regional Party.57 Order 00447 specified that each 
province, territory, and republic had a quota to meet. In total, the order suggested that after four 
months there should be 268,950 arrests and 72,950 executions.58 Stalin and his inner circle tightly 
controlled the measures to achieve these goals – the Politburo issued instructions and approved 
NKVD orders, quotas established in Moscow governed the actions of the troikas, the Military 
Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court dealt with high-profile arrests, and Stalin, along with his 
leadership group comprised of Molotov, Vorshilov, Kagonovich, and Zhadnov, oversaw the entire 
process.59 
Order 00447 was carried out in secret.60 NKVD agents tortured suspected enemies to elicit 
confessions, and once the confessions were secured, they used Nagan pistols to shoot their victims 
in the head. The methods of torture varied, but in most cases prisoners were deprived of sleep, 
forced to stand for endless hours, and beaten until they confessed. NKVD agents also plunged 
prisoners’ heads into latrines. Stalin, who was briefed by Ezhov on an ongoing basis, approved 
these methods.61  
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NKVD officers targeted the criminal elements in urban areas, focusing on bandits, armed 
robbers, organized and professional criminals, and recidivists. They also sought out homeless 
children with histories of hooliganism.62 The kulaks (who had survived revolution, 
collectivization, famine, exile, and the Gulag) presented a more difficult problem to solve.63 
Collectivization and “dekulakization” affected millions of families throughout the USSR. Many 
of these former kulaks began returning to their native lands by the mid-1930s, hoping to recover 
their confiscated property and reestablish some of their former authority and influence.64 Those 
who had been exiled or imprisoned began returning to the collective farms. Others headed for 
urban areas and began blending in with the working classes.65 The great fear for Stalin and the 
Party was that these former kulaks would incite the people to rebellion.66  
All of these contingents – kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements – represented 
a potential social base of insurrection.67 In the event of another great war, this base could destroy 
the Soviet Union from within. The kulaks still in camps and in Siberian exile could potentially 
support a Japanese invasion.68 An NKVD report in 1937 stated that these kulaks constituted “a 
broad base on which to build an insurgent rebellion.”69 But an even greater threat was found to the 
west, in Soviet Ukraine where former kulaks could support a German invasion. This region became 
the major killing center, where NKVD officers executed 70,868 people in response to order 
00447.70 
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Stalin increased local and regional quotas, far exceeding the original goals laid out by 
Frinovskii and Ezhov. In total, order 00447 resulted in 385,000 executions. Additionally, 316,000 
more people were sent to the Gulag.71 But the Great Terror was far from over. The USSR faced 
other potential threats, and Stalin was determined to eliminate all possible enemies before they had 
the opportunity to betray the fatherland. The “National Operations” targeted ethnic contingents, 
leaving non-Russian nationalities across the Soviet Union vulnerable and helpless, susceptible to 
the blood purges that had already claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and 
children, both the prominent and the obscure. 
 
The National Operations  
In 1936, Maria Juriewicz was a young woman living in Leningrad with her two sisters. 
Falling in love, she married Stanislaw Wyganowski. For reasons unknown to either the Juriewicz 
family or Stanislaw, NKVD officers arrested Maria in August, 1937. Stanislaw, hoping to find out 
why his wife had been arrested, inquired with the local authorities. But he was also arrested, and 
a few weeks later NKVD agents showed up at the Juriewicz family home and arrested one of 
Maria’s other sisters, Elzbieta. Without any explanation, without any proof of guilt, and without 
any form of legal proceedings, Stanislaw, Maria, and Elzbieta were all shot and buried in mass 
graves.  
During the course of the national operations, 6,597 Soviet citizens were shot in the 
Leningrad region. Many, like Stanislaw, Maria, and Elzbieta, lost their lives for no reason other 
than their Polish ethnicity. When Ezhov reported on his progress in the operation – 23,216 arrests 
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after only twenty days – Stalin responded, “Very good! Keep on digging up and cleaning out this 
Polish filth.”72  
Even though the national operations were not talked about in the papers, people understood 
that something ominous was happening in their cities, towns, and villages. Individuals would 
simply disappear. Family members were told they had been sentenced to ten years in the Gulag 
with no right for correspondence.73 In the early morning hours, small black vans patrolled the 
streets. These were the notorious Black Marias, or “black ravens.” Once they arrived at their 
desired destination, NKVD officers would exit the truck and knock on the door. Everyone knew 
what happened next: once arrested, most were never to be seen or heard from again.74 
Many were taken to buildings and led into basements where agents would torture them 
until they confessed to crimes such as sabotage, terrorism, or espionage. The goal of the agents 
was to force people to confess that there was a Polish conspiracy, a master plan to destroy the 
USSR. In places like Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus, officers perfected the “conference 
method.” They would fill a basement with a large number of Poles and torture one person, forcing 
the others to watch. Once this victim confessed, the others were told that they had a choice – they 
could confess or be tortured. In these cases, most people confessed and the agents were able to 
secure more “evidence” in support of the Polish conspiracy theory.75 
The national operations began on 9 August, 1937, when the Politburo approved the NKVD 
order “On Liquidating Polish Sabotage-Espionage Groups.” This order, 00485, provided the 
framework for dealing with “counterrevolutionary national contingents.” The Poles were not the 
only targets: other orders quickly followed 00485 and identified other groups that needed to be 
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repressed, including Germans, Romanians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Afghans, Iranians, 
Chinese, Bulgarians, and Macedonians.76 This was an unprecedented step for Stalin and his 
leadership group, a step that transformed and radicalized the Terror. The targets were no longer 
“class enemies,” such as kulaks, but national groups specifically targeted as enemies of the 
people.77 
Once again, the great fear for Stalin was that these groups would support the Germans or 
the Japanese in the event of an invasion. Their very presence was a national security threat.78 At 
this point, a second world war seemed inevitable. The logic was simple – if these populations were 
removed, either through executions, deportations, or incarcerations, then the Germans and 
Japanese would find no support in the Soviet Union.79 If they remained, they could potentially 
become spies and collaborators.80 The ideal of an empire of nations had been replaced with 
explicitly pro-Russian sentiments and policies. By the beginning of 1938, the Russian language 
was made compulsory in all Soviet schools.81  
Ordered to “destroy the Poles entirely,” NKVD officers used any available method to 
locate their targets. Some officers even searched for names that sounded Polish in the city records, 
found their addresses, and showed up on their doorsteps with the Black Marias.82 By the time the 
national operations concluded, nearly 240,000 people had been shot.83 The USSR was supposed 
to be a multicultural and multiethnic state.84 In an interview with Roy Howard in 1936, Stalin 
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proclaimed that in the Soviet Union there was no oppression of nationalities. He boasted about the 
constitution, telling Howard that “In my opinion our new Soviet constitution will be the most 
democratic in the world.”85 By 1938, when the national operations finally concluded, NKVD 
officers executed 85,000 Poles, 47,327 people in Soviet Ukraine, 17,772 in Soviet Belarus, 16,573 
in Soviet Latvia, 9,078 in Finland, and 7,998 in Soviet Estonia.86 Countless others vanished in the 
Gulag, died from torture, or perished while imprisoned.87 Over 170,000 Koreans were deported 
from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.88 Around 40,000 died following the deportation 
because of malnutrition, disease, and other related causes.89 Had Stalin met his objective? Had he 
succeeded in eliminating a possible base of insurrection, the potential “fifth column” that could 
make the difference between victory and defeat in the next world war?90 For Stalin and the Soviet 
Union, only time would tell. 
 
“The Perverse Logic of Utopia”91   
On 10 April , 1939, agents arrested Nikolai Ezhov, head of the Soviet Union’s secret police. 
He spent the next year of his life in prison where he was subjected to the same brutal interrogation 
techniques that he encouraged his officers to employ throughout the Great Terror. Now he too, 
like so many before him, confessed to a litany of absurdities: being a Polish spy, a German spy 
who had plotted to assassinate Stalin, a homosexual, and a Lithuanian. His father, Ezhov 
confessed, was not really a former factory worker, but a brothel operator. And his mother, a bar 
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hall dancer. At his trial, Ezhov retracted these false confessions and maintained his loyalty to the 
Party and, above all else, his devotion to Stalin. On 2 February, 1940, immediately following the 
trial, NKVD officers executed Ezhov.92 
The Great Terror had officially ended in August, 1938. Stalin brought in L. P. Beria to be 
Ezhov’s deputy, and in October and November a Politburo commission began investigating 
NKVD “abuses.” Ezhov’s assistants were arrested and began testifying against their chief. Ezhov’s 
wife committed suicide after she was accused of maintaining relationships with suspicious 
contacts. Soon Ezhov was arrested and Beria took over his position as head of the NKVD.93  
From the Kremlin in Moscow, Joseph Stalin had centrally orchestrated the Terror. From 
beginning to end, he maintained absolute control of the bloody repressions that took the lives of 
nearly 700,000 people.94 The Terror, among other things, was an attempt to cleanse the Soviet 
Union of counterrevolutionary contingents. As a path to a radiant future and an all-encompassing 
guide to action, ideology was the driving force of Stalin’s purges. The writings of Lenin and Marx, 
specifically Marx’s and Engel’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, reveal an imperative to 
eliminate certain groups from the body politic in order to realize a socialist society.95 Stalin 
believed it was essential to remove what he considered “socially dangerous” contingents from the 
Soviet Union. This is the quintessence of Soviet ideology – class warfare and the need to eliminate 
various classes and groups of people believed to pose a threat to socialism. This is made apparent 
in the very first constitution under the new Bolshevik government in 1918. There would be asylum 
for foreigners facing political oppression and inclusion of national minorities, but they would be 
deprived of their rights if those individuals or groups acted “to the detriment of the socialist 
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revolution.”96 The Terror, initiated by Stalin and carried out by NKVD agents, was an effort to 
purify the USSR of those contingents that had the potential to undermine the revolution and 
destabilize the USSR. This was a “free union of free nations,” until that freedom threatened the 
Soviet experiment.97 
The regime applied the counterrevolutionary label in two distinct ways: the first, on those 
groups or individuals considered to pose a “potential” threat, and the second, following from 
Marx’s theory of historical development, on those groups or classes sentenced by History to wither 
and perish. These two often overlapped, as with former kulaks, for example, who were believed to 
both pose a potential threat to the regime and had no place in the socialist utopia. The case of the 
nationalities and ethnicities is somewhat unique because History did not sentence them to perish, 
but to assimilate and merge with proletariat identity.98 Because this process of assimilation had 
failed to take place by 1937, and since Stalin had neither the time nor the patience to wait for this 
historical process to naturally occur, they too were deemed counterrevolutionary as a potential 
fifth column in the event of war. Leading up to this point, it is important to remember, both Lenin 
and Stalin believed the process of assimilation would occur naturally. The socialist state they had 
created was anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. They wished to incorporate national identities, 
not oppress them and not force them to become something they were not, as Alexander III had 
done with his “Russification” initiatives in the late 19th century. Circumstances intersected with 
ideology, leading to changes in practices and policies. 
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 It is difficult to fathom, but when such logic was applied during the purges, men like 
Andrei Grigor’evich Nademskii, the Orthodox priest from Kiev who was executed in 1938, and 
women like Maria Juriewicz, the newlywed from Leningrad who was shot to death in 1937, were 
in fact counterrevolutionaries – Nademskii because he was a priest and, according to Marx, there 
would be no priests in the future utopia; Juriewicz because she was Polish, and again, according 
to Marx, national identities were supposed to merge into a single, proletariat identity. In both cases, 
they were not only potential threats to the revolution, but also sentenced by the supranatural force 
of History to wither and die. 
Because Soviet ideology followed from Marxism, a theoretical political philosophy that 
projected and predicted future events, there was a profound emphasis placed on the process of 
becoming, on the notion of potentiality. Former kulaks, recidivist criminals, and nationalities were 
enemies because of what they might do under certain circumstances, such as the outbreak of 
another great war, and what they had the potential to do if given the opportunity, such as if they 
were given support from a foreign state opposed to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the idea of 
revolution was framed as a force that was in constant and continuous motion, not simply as an 
event that began when the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 and concluded when they 
triumphed in the Civil War. The revolution was a process, a continuum, that would only conclude 
when socialism reigned throughout the world. Enemies sought to disrupt this process by first 
destroying the Party in the Soviet Union and then preventing it from spreading across Europe. For 
the Soviet regime, led by men like Stalin, Ezhov, Molotov, and Kagonovich, these enemy 
contingents had to be annihilated in order to save the revolution.  
But if this true, then why not simply arrest and execute the accused? Why spend the time, 
and the manpower, torturing and tormenting them, forcing them to sign the most absurd 
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confessions? It is important to consider another important concept of Soviet ideology – the idea of 
developing and evolving political consciousness. This process occurred through various forms of 
education. The vanguard, or the Party, controlled the Soviet Union, but the millions of workers 
and poor peasants were destined to evolve and govern the coming utopia. Like the symbolism 
inherent on the Soviet flag, the Party rose above the masses of workers and poor peasants, 
illuminating the path and guiding the way. The forced confessions had a specific purpose: to 
educate and inform the populace. The lesson to be learned was that their nation was surrounded 
by threats to the revolution, by enemies who wished to restore capitalism and once again enslave 
the masses. The lesson was vigilance – traitors, spies, and wreckers were everywhere; to protect 
their present order and ensure their radiant future, citizens needed to be proactive defenders of the 
revolution.  
The mass and national operations, however, present a more complex problem. There were 
hundreds of thousands of forced confessions that were never made public. Why? What was the 
purpose? Again, the answer rests on Soviet ideology. Unlike the Nazi regime who openly 
employed mass terror and violence in their pursuit of social transformation, the Soviet Union was 
predicated on the socialist ideals of rational progress and egalitarian ethics. Their rule could not 
appear to be grounded in violence and repression. As Martin Malia wrote, “It was thus necessary 
for the Soviets to make their ‘enemies’ confess to criminal actions and thereby recognize their 
elimination as just and deserved.”99  
Although the purge of the Leninist old guard and the hunt for enemies of the people was a 
gruesome and bloody affair that destroyed tens of thousands of families throughout the USSR, it 
pales in comparison, at least numerically, to the mass and national operations. Approximately 
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40,000 from the old guard were shot.100 NKVD agents executed between 20,000 and 25,000 more 
as a result of denunciations. Combined, these executions represent only 9% of the total number of 
victims who lost their lives in the Great Terror. Theories arguing for mass participation are not 
supported by the evidence. There was certainly participation in urban centers like Moscow and 
Leningrad, where millions of people were caught up in the madness, as both Wendy Goldman and 
Sheila Fitzpatrick have demonstrated, but denunciations played no part in either the national 
operations or the kulak operations. These operations were initiated by Stalin and carried out by the 
NKVD.101 When historians argue that the Terror actually began with the mass operations, it is 
because 91% of the total number of victims, some 625,000 people, were executed during this 
period of the purges – 385,000 from NKVD order 00447 and 240,000 from order 00485 and the 
national operations.102 Nearly 390,000 more were sent to the Gulag.103 The total number of people 
who died in the camps is still unknown. 
Years later, Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the key members of Stalin’s inner circle, talked 
about the blood purges. “I believe we had to pass through a period of terror,” Molotov said. “The 
terror cost us dearly, but without it things would have been worse. Many people who should not 
have been touched suffered… Stalin insisted on making doubly sure: spare no one, but guarantee 
absolute stability in the country for a long period of time – through the war and postwar years, 
which was certainly achieved.”104 This pragmatic, utilitarian reasoning was employed by Lenin 
during the Civil War, as he used the Cheka to unleash the Red Terror, and by Stalin, nearly twenty 
years later, during the Great Terror. In both cases, no one was spared – and in both cases stability 
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followed. Of course, for Stalin, the Soviet Union would have to fight a second bloody world war 
before the economic, political, and social stability could be experienced. 
A remarkable 70% of purge victims had some form of higher education.105 Stalin wanted 
to eliminate all possible competing ideologies, worldviews, and nationalist movements. There 
could be no opposition; there could be no factions. Another important consideration, and a crucial 
one for Stalin, was the type of education.  Even though a great majority of the Leninist old guard 
employed in the Party, the army, the Komsomol, and the factories had some higher education, their 
schooling had not been technical in nature. The future of the USSR, and the future of the world, 
Stalin believed, would be driven by technically trained cadres. By purging Soviet institutions, 
Stalin was able to fill the void with a new generation of technically trained men and women. As 
Fainsod wrote in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, with rapid industrialization in the early 1930s, there 
was a desperate need for engineers and technicians, resulting in “an overhauling of the educational 
system, an emphasis on technical training, and the growth of a new Soviet-trained technical 
intelligentsia.”106 By the late 1930s, this new Soviet intelligentsia was ready to lead and guide the 
USSR for the next fifty years. 
Richard Pipes wrote, “It is entirely futile to seek any single explanation for major 
occurrences.”107 To understand the Great Terror, a phenomenon defined by astonishing 
complexity, it is necessary to explore a multitude of interpretations. But this too needs to be 
questioned. Maybe the first and last place to look for an explanation is with the Party. As one of 
the defendants in the Moscow show trials stated, “the slightest rift with the Party, the slightest 
insincerity towards the Party, the slightest hesitation with regard to the leadership, with regard to 
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the Central Committee, is enough to land you in the camp of counterrevolution.”108 The Party was 
always right. If the Party said you were a counterrevolutionary, then you were a 
counterrevolutionary. The Party, represented by Stalin and his inner circle, issued orders. NKVD 
agents carried out the orders. There could be no debate. 
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CHAPTER 5 “EPILOGUE” 
“It is through madness that the greatest good things have come to Greece,” Plato said, in 
concert with all ancient mankind. 1 
 
On 25 February, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his notorious “Secret Speech” to the 
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For several hours, Khrushchev 
railed against the former General Secretary, criticizing the celebrated Stalin for his “glaring 
violations of revolutionary legality.”2 Khrushchev argued that Stalin was directly responsible for 
a brutal campaign of “mass repression and terror.”3 He accused the former Party leader of 
employing “mass terror against the Party cadres.”4 As the dismayed delegates listened to the litany 
of charges and accusations, Khrushchev proclaimed “that many entirely innocent persons, who in 
the past had defended the Party line, became victims.”5 Providing details as to why so many highly 
esteemed Party members had  admitted to being spies, traitors, and wreckers, Khrushchev revealed 
the use of the “barbaric tortures”6 that were systematically employed to secure admissions of guilt. 
Khrushchev used the speech to personally rehabilitate many of victims of the Great Terror. But as 
he finished naming several of the innocent Party members who had been executed, it became clear 
that the most controversial victims of Stalin’s Terror would not be rehabilitated: Zinoviev, 
Kamenev, and Bukharin. And Khrushchev concluded his speech without placing any blame or 
responsibility on those members of Stalin’s inner circle who had helped him to plan and carry out 
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the Terror: Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kagonovich.7 Was the speech a passionate condemnation of 
Stalinism? Or was it a calculated political maneuver designed to empower Khrushchev and his 
supporters?  
By not rehabilitating men like Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, the implication was that 
they were in fact “enemies of the people.” And by focusing his speech on the crimes of Stalin, on 
“Stalin’s despotism,”8 Khrushchev avoided discussing the profoundly positive effects the Stalinist 
system had on the Soviet Union. Through rapid industrialization, collectivization, cultural 
revolution, and mass purges, Stalin succeeded in building and defending socialism in Russia. From 
1928 to 1940, industrialization grew at a remarkable rate of 12-14% per year, the urban population 
doubled, and the number of workers doubled. In the same time span, heavy industry exploded, 
with steel production increased fourfold, coal production increased fivefold, and the generation of 
electrical power increased ninefold. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was the second 
largest industrial power in the world.9 In analyzing the effects of the Great Terror, as a result of 
applying a Western, deontological perspective, historians have focused almost entirely on the 
tragic loss of life, largely ignoring the industrial and economic legacy of Stalinism. 
After suffering early losses and defeats in the Second World War, the Soviet Union rallied 
to crush Nazi Germany. One of main reasons for this was that the USSR’s production of planes, 
tanks, and artillery far surpassed Germany’s.10 The Soviet Union emerged from the war victorious, 
as one of the two world superpowers. The USSR now represented the great alternative to 
capitalism, with its ability to withstand economic catastrophes such as the Great Depression and 
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its capacity to defeat an international menace like Nazi Germany. Communism became a global 
force, and the era of the Soviet empire had begun.11 The USSR now controlled the Baltic states of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, extended the Soviet border westward into eastern Europe, regained 
territory, privilege, and influence in northeastern China and Korea, and reclaimed territory that 
had been lost to Japan.12 In 1949, the Soviet Union, a nation that much of the Western world had 
for decades regarded as “backwards,” successfully tested its first nuclear device.13 With similar 
socialist regimes soon founded in China and North Korea, the Soviet Union and the Communist 
Party became “father of the peoples” to a third of humanity.14 And not long after Khrushchev’s 
speech, the Soviet Union led the way in the race to space, with the launching of Sputnik, the first 
satellite, in 1957,  completing the first moon landing in 1959, and successfully putting the first 
man into space in 1961. Only twenty-five years earlier, on the eve of the Great Terror, Stalin spoke 
of the dire state of Soviet technology, of the USSR’s scandalous backwardness. 
How could such astounding advances occur in such a short period of time? The answer, 
although disturbing on so many levels, is provided by examining the Great Terror. The NKVD 
executed nearly 700,000 people during the course of the blood purges. Several hundred thousand 
more died in the Gulag. The horrific violence and brutality tore apart countless families and 
annihilated the dreams and aspirations of innumerable Soviet citizens. We will never know how 
many wives became widows, how many children became orphans, and how many young men and 
women forfeited their youth and vitality in the abominable abyss of the Soviet Gulag. But the 
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13 Hunt, 53. 
14 Malia, 274. 
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historian, tasked with the analysis of causation, must look beyond the colossal moral transgressions 
and try to understand how phenomena like the Great Terror affect state structures and institutions. 
Socialism, as outlined by Marx and Engels, entails industrialization, urbanization, and a 
preponderance of workers. All this, in turn, demands technically educated cadres. Leninism, as 
expressed in the Tenth Party Congress, requires the elimination of all opposition – there can be no 
dissent, no factions within the Party. Communism necessitates a unified political body, with all 
members of the political community eventually identifying, through an evolutionary process, not 
as various ethnic or national groups, but as Communist workers. And the Soviet Union, as the very 
symbol of the socialist state and the realization of Marxism, needed as their impenetrable 
foundation an army of workers and soldiers. Stalin, as a progressive, forward-looking leader, 
understood that the masses of “anti-Soviet elements” – the kulaks, priests, and petty criminals – 
had no place in the future Soviet state. Stalinism addressed all of these issues through its 
revolutionary policies and programs. 
A new generation of technically educated men and women replaced the old guard, building 
the tanks and planes that would defeat Nazi Germany and designing the rockets and satellites that 
would launch the Soviet Union beyond the Iron Curtain and into outer space. Ethnic populations 
and national contingents that had the potential to revolt against the Soviet Union were repressed, 
either through mass executions or mass deportations. The kulaks, with the potential to incite 
rebellion amongst the Soviet Union’s immense rural population were also violently repressed. 
When World War II broke out in 1939, and even as the USSR suffered devastating losses 
throughout 1940 and 1941, there was no “fifth column” to rise up against the Communist Party. 
For Stalin to build and defend socialism in Russia, and for the Soviet Union to become a global 
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superpower, the Great Terror, although morally repulsive and ethically monstrous, was an absolute 
necessity.  
In the 1930s, a radicalized and militarized socialist ideology intersected with extremely 
threatening foreign and domestic circumstances. The result of this intersection was the Great 
Terror. The circumstances demanded a response; the ideology determined the response. To 
transform the USSR into a global superpower, the Soviet state employed a number of radical 
policies. Mass terror was one of these policies, the “crimson madness” that destroyed the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens. But from this destruction emerged an immense 
Communist empire. The telos had been realized. 
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
 My first semester at Wayne State University, in the winter of 2015, I took Dr. Aaron 
Retish’s class on the Russian Revolution. He asked us, his students, to choose a topic for our term 
paper before we left for Spring Break. As someone who has always had a passion for art and 
literature, and looking to focus on the culture of the period, I chose to write my paper on Vasily 
Kandinsky. I spent most of my evenings during Spring Break relaxing and watching movies. One 
night I decided to watch Schindler’s List. I had seen the film years before, but thought, as an 
aspiring historian, that it was something I should watch a second time. As I sat motionless in the 
darkness of my living room, I was deeply disturbed and confounded by the horrific violence. For 
nearly three hours, I kept asking myself the same question over and over again: why? Why such 
repulsive acts of violence and brutality?  
 I sent Dr. Retish an email the following night and asked him if I could change my topic. I 
told him that I now wanted to write my paper on state violence and terror. I spent the next several 
weeks exploring the Red Terror, the first campaign of mass terror and repression under Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks. By the time the semester had ended, I knew I would devote myself to studying the 
political violence of modern Europe. For the next two years, under Dr. Retish’s supervision, I 
wrote papers on Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Great Terror. From the beginning, there was 
something curiously fascinating about the Great Terror – the cult of Stalin, the spectacle of the 
show trials, the vast number of ethnic groups affected, the assault on the kulaks and criminals, and 
the secret police ominously drifting through the streets of Leningrad and Moscow in their black 
ravens. I needed to understand why Stalin had ordered his secret police to arrest and execute 
hundreds of thousands of his own people. Why? If I could answer this question, then I would be 
able to make some sense of the extraordinary political violence that plagues our modern world. 
